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ARTICLES
(IN)FORMAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY
Michael J. Higdon*
In 2015, same-sex couples throughout the United States obtained formal
marriage equality. But is the prospective ability to obtain marriage licenses
sufficient to achieve Obergefell v. Hodges’s promise of equality? What about
individuals whose same-sex relationship did not survive—either through
death or dissolution—to see marriage equality become the law of the land?
Or those couples who did ultimately wed but now have a marriage that
appears to be artificially short when considering just how long the couple
has actually been together in a marriage-like relationship? With marriage
benefits conditioned not only on the fact of marriage but also the length of
marriage, individuals in both categories continue to suffer harm as a result
of the unconstitutional laws that prevented them from marrying at an earlier
point in time. Although some states have attempted to remedy this problem
by backdating same-sex marriages, the reality is that the availability of such
relief varies by state and, what is more, no state has yet formulated a test to
adequately protect the interests of those individuals. This Article is the first
to propose a specific solution to these problems—a solution that requires
states to formulate and adopt a new equitable remedy, referred to here as
“equitable marriage.” Drawing on existing equitable doctrines that states
have already developed to extend formal family law benefits to those in
informal family-like relationships, equitable marriage would treat same-sex
relationships that predated formal marriage equality as the equivalent of a
legal marriage with all the attendant rights and obligations. In the case of
same-sex couples who ultimately did wed, equitable marriage would require
that the time the couple spent in a marriage-like relationship count as part
of the formal marriage, so as to extend all marital benefits conditioned on
length of marriage. To succeed, claimants would need to establish that the
couple would have wed during that time period but for the unconstitutional
laws depriving them of that fundamental right. Understanding the
complexity of such an approach, this Article offers guidance on how courts
should implement and apply equitable marriage so as to achieve full

* Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law, University of Tennessee
College of Law. I am grateful to the University of Tennessee College of Law, particularly
Deans Melanie Wilson and Doug Blaze, for providing generous financial support for this
project.

1351

1352

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

marriage equality while, at the same time, resisting impermissible gender
stereotypes and heterosexist notions of how marriage “should” look.
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INTRODUCTION
I made sure to add “and days past” in our vows because by the time we got
married, we had already lived together for 42 years. You can’t forget that.
—Edith Windsor1

On three separate occasions, the United States has witnessed large, discrete
groups of adults simultaneously earning the right to marry the person of their
choice—a right that had been denied them for many years. The first occurred
after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,2 which cleared the way for
former slaves to finally enter into legal marriages.3 The second came in 1967

1. Corinne Werder, 20 Epic Edie Windsor Quotes to Always Remember Her By, GO
MAG. (Sept. 13, 2017), http://gomag.com/article/20-epic-edie-windsor-quotes-to-alwaysremember-her-by [https://perma.cc/88DJ-R9DT]. Edith Windsor was the named plaintiff in
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
2. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIII.
3. Prior to emancipation, slaves were permitted to “marry,” but such unions had
absolutely no legal effect: “As chattel, slaves were objects, not subjects. Marriage for them
was not an inviolable union between two people but an institution defined and controlled by
the superior relationship of master to slave.” TERA W. HUNTER, BOUND IN WEDLOCK: SLAVE
AND FREE BLACK MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 6 (2017).
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after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia4 struck down
anti-miscegenation laws in the sixteen states that still prohibited interracial
marriage.5 The third example, which forms the basis of this Article, came in
2015 when the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges6 ushered in
marriage equality for same-sex couples throughout the United States. In each
instance, those couples impacted by the change in law were now permitted
to solemnize their relationships and, thus, enjoy all the legal protections that
flow from formal marriage. At the same time, each instance prompted the
question of what, if any, legal effect was to be given to the time some couples
spent in a quasi-marital state while awaiting the right to legally wed. After
all, to ignore those years altogether would lead to a number of legal harms—
harms inconsistent with the ideal of true marriage equality.7
To illustrate, consider Michael Ely and James Taylor, who met in 1971
when Michael was eighteen and James was twenty.8 The two men became
involved and would spend the next forty-three years together, living first in
California and later in Arizona.9 In October 2014, five days after U.S.
District Court Judge John Sedgwick ruled that Arizona’s prohibition on
same-sex marriage was unconstitutional,10 the two men obtained a marriage
license and married just two weeks later.11 Sadly, their legal marriage only
lasted six months because, in May of 2015, James died of cancer at the age
of sixty-three.12 Michael, devastated by the loss of his partner of over forty
years, also suffered financially given that the couple primarily relied on
James’s employment for income.13 Michael filed for Social Security benefits
as James’s surviving spouse, but his application was denied because of a
provision in the Social Security Act14 that requires a surviving spouse to have
been married to the “insured individual” for nine months to qualify for
benefits.15 Due to the timing of James’s death—but primarily to the fact that
the two men had been legally prohibited from getting married for the majority
of their relationship—Michael was three months shy of meeting that
requirement.16

4. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. See Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans on Interracial
Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2746 (2008) (“Despite the moral
and practical untenability of antimiscegenation laws, they remained in place in sixteen states
(all of them in the South) by the time the Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia.”).
6. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive & Other Relief at 2, Ely v. Saul, No. 18-cv0557, 2020 WL 2744138 (D. Ariz. May 27, 2020) [hereinafter Ely Complaint].
9. Id. at 2–3.
10. See generally Connolly v. Jeanes, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (D. Ariz. 2014).
11. Ely Complaint, supra note 8, at 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
15. Ely Complaint, supra note 8, at 3–4; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e)–(f), 416(c), (g).
16. Ely Complaint, supra note 8, at 3–4.
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Ely and Taylor represent just one of the many same-sex couples whose
relationships began long before marriage equality was even a consideration,
much less a reality. For those couples that were ultimately able to wed, their
marriage licenses bestowed legal benefits that had been denied them for
many years. For instance, James Obergefell, the named plaintiff in the case
responsible for securing this new freedom, had been living in a marriage-like
relationship with his partner for over twenty years.17 Similarly, Edith
Windsor, the woman responsible for ending the portion of the Defense of
Marriage Act18 (DOMA) that excluded same-sex spouses from the federal
definition of “spouse,”19 had been with her partner for forty years before the
two were finally permitted to marry.20 Other same-sex couples never even
got that opportunity as, in many cases, individuals died before they could
legally marry the person they had been waiting to wed. The question that
emerges then is what remedy should apply to those in same-sex relationships
who were either never permitted to wed or those whose eventual marriages
fail to capture the true length of their “marital” relationships.
In Obergefell, Justice Anthony Kennedy spoke of the “constellation of
benefits”21 that marriage affords and two years later, the Court reiterated that
“a State may not ‘exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same
terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.’”22 As Ely and Taylor’s story
illustrates, however, a number of marital benefits are tied not just to the fact
of marriage but to the length of the marriage.23 Accordingly, if states are to
comply with Obergefell’s directive, there must be some accounting for the
time same-sex couples spent in relationships that—but for the legal
prohibitions against it—would have been marriages. And this requirement
must apply to those who were precluded from ever marrying and those samesex spouses who first spent time in a quasi-marital state awaiting that right.
To do otherwise would permit an unconstitutional law—the kind Justice
Antonin Scalia has described as “void, and . . . as no law”24—to continue to
harm the very population on whose behalf the law was struck down. Such a
result is impermissible. As the Supreme Court has made clear, when a law
is deemed unconstitutional, “that rule is the controlling interpretation of
federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on

17. Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage Equality
Continued, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE S52, S60 (2015).
18. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. 744 (2013).
19. See generally Windsor, 570 U.S. 744.
20. Edith Windsor and her partner, Thea Spyer, were wed in 2007 in Canada. See id. at
749; see also Christine L. Nemacheck, The Path to Obergefell: Saying “I Do” to New Judicial
Federalism?, 54 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 149, 163 (2017) (noting that, prior to marrying, the
couple had been together for over forty years).
21. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015).
22. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017) (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 647).
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 760 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879)).
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direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate
or postdate our announcement of the rule.”25
Whereas other scholars have noted this need for some form of retroactive
application of Obergefell,26 there is as of yet no formulation of how exactly
courts should do it. And to the extent courts have wrestled with this issue,
they have taken vastly different approaches and have arrived at opposite
conclusions.27 A few have given effect to the time same-sex couples spent
in relationships while awaiting the right to formally wed, doing so either
through laws relating to common-law marriage or by looking into whether
the couple would have married earlier had that option been available to
them.28 Others have simply refused to go beyond the dates of a legal
marriage, thus not affording any legal significance to time spent in a preequality relationship, regardless of how long that relationship lasted or the
severity of the harms that would result from failing to count that time.29 True
marriage equality, then, remains a work in progress. This is problematic not
only for the continued discrimination faced by those who—pre-Obergefell—
spent time in committed, same-sex relationships but also for the fact that the
right to marry is a constitutionally protected right and, as such, some
standards are required. After all, “it is the nature of a constitution to set outer
limits to legislative competence.”30
There are, however, a number of thorny questions associated with any
attempt to backdate same-sex marriages. For instance, how does the law
determine when a premarital relationship became sufficiently “marriagelike” to warrant counting some portion of it toward the length of the eventual
marriage? Relatedly, how can the law accurately determine when a samesex couple would have married had they been given the opportunity?
Further, given the discrimination faced by the LGBTQIA+ community, many
of them might have kept their relationships secret, making it difficult for them
to now prove the earlier existence of a marriage-like relationship. Finally,
given the heteronormative foundation of marriage,31 what does “marriagelike” even mean anymore, especially when applied to a group of Americans
whom society has for decades conditioned to view marriage as a social
institution reserved for people who are unlike them?32 As one commentator
25. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (emphasis added).
26. See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Backdating Marriage, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 395 (2017); Charles
W. Rhodes, Loving Retroactivity, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 383 (2018); Mark Strasser,
Obergefell, Retroactivity, and Common Law Marriage, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 379 (2017); Lee-ford
Tritt, Moving Forward by Looking Back: The Retroactive Application of Obergefell, 2016
WIS. L. REV. 873.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. See infra notes 179–87 and accompanying text.
30. Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a
Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 798 (1964).
31. Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1371 (2005)
(referencing “[m]arriage’s heteronormative roots”).
32. See Yuvraj Joshi, Respectable Queerness, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415, 444
(2012) (“[I]t appears implausible that the law, once it has recognized same-sex marriage, will
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said after witnessing marriage equality in the Netherlands in 1998, “it was an
amazing feeling . . . because I had never imagined that possibility.”33
It is the goal of this Article to provide answers to those questions. In so
doing, this Article seeks to offer a path forward for states as they attempt to
give effect to the full promise of Obergefell. That path is made easier by the
fact that states already employ their inherent equitable powers to bestow
family law protections on informal relationships that arose outside the legal
requirements for family formation.34 Although none of the state remedies
are adequate in this context, they are nonetheless instructive when it comes
to fashioning a new equitable doctrine that would adequately address the time
same-sex couples spent in marriage-like relationships while awaiting
marriage equality. Essentially, that doctrine—referred to here as “equitable
marriage”—would treat that time as either a legal marriage or, in the case of
same-sex couples who ultimately wed, as part of the formal marriage if the
claimant could establish that the couple would have wed during that time
period but for the unconstitutional laws depriving them of that fundamental
right.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I chronicles the history of formal
marriage equality in the United States as it applies to same-sex couples. Part
II then turns to informal marriage equality, focusing on how Obergefell
stands for the proposition that, going forward, states must do more than
simply issue marriage licenses to remedy the unconstitutional denial of samesex couples’ right to marry. In so doing, Part II explores the benefits tied to
marriage, particularly those tied to length of marriage, and how states have
attempted to answer the question of whether Obergefell demands retroactive
application. Part III proposes the need for an equitable remedy that, in some
form or another, all states must adopt. To understand that need and what
form the remedy might take, Part III details similar equitable remedies that
courts have previously relied on to provide family law benefits to family-like
relationships. Part IV then explores how the proposed equitable marriage
remedy would provide similar protections to those marriages that fail to
account for informal relationships that would have been marriages had legal
prohibitions not prevented solemnization. As part of that proposal, Part IV
examines how courts might apply equitable marriage, offering potential
solutions to the complications and objections any such remedy will inevitably
bring.
I. THE PATH TO FORMAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY
In 1967, when the Supreme Court struck down state laws that prohibited
an individual from marrying someone of another race, the Court identified
develop a more nuanced understanding of sexuality that undercuts its heteronormative
assumptions.”).
33. Laurie J. Kendall, Dancing with My Grandma: Talking with Robyn Ochs About
Complex Identities and Simple Messages in the Marriage Equality Movement, in BISEXUALITY
AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 181, 199 (M. Paz Galupo ed., 2009).
34. See infra Part III.
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“freedom of choice” as an implicit component of the right to marry.35 That
case was, of course, Loving v. Virginia, and five years later, Richard Baker
and James McConnell would rely on it when they became the first same-sex
couple to challenge discriminatory marriage laws.36 The two men had sought
a marriage license under Minnesota law, which did not explicitly require the
two parties to be of opposite sex.37 Nonetheless, their application was
denied, and the two men subsequently brought suit, arguing that “the right to
marry without regard to the sex of the parties is a fundamental right of all
persons and that restricting marriage to only couples of the opposite sex is
irrational and invidiously discriminatory.”38
Baker and McConnell lost both at the trial court and on appeal to the state
supreme court.39 In ruling, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiffs’ reliance on Loving, holding that, “in commonsense and in a
constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction
based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in
sex.”40 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the two men would lose once
more, this time with a mere one-sentence summary disposition: “Appeal . . .
dismissed for want of substantial federal question.”41 And with that, the
nation’s first legal challenge to state laws that prevented individuals from
marrying a person of the same sex would come to an end.
For the most part, the issue would lie dormant for the next twenty years.
Then, in the 1990s, something happened that would cause “the issue of samesex marriage [to] burst into the consciousness of the American public.”42
Specifically, three same-sex couples in Hawaii decided to apply for marriage

35. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires that
the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.”).
36. Anthony Michael Kreis, Stages of Constitutional Grief:
Democratic
Constitutionalism and the Marriage Revolution, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 871, 881 (2018)
(“Baker and McConnell alleged Minnesota’s marriage law ran afoul of the First, Eighth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
37. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971) (“Petitioners contend, first,
that the absence of an express statutory prohibition against same-sex marriages evinces a
legislative intent to authorize such marriages.”), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)
(mem.), overruled bv Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
38. Id. at 186.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 187.
41. Baker, 409 U.S. at 810.
42. Arthur S. Leonard, Going for the Brass Ring: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 572, 572 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAMESEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUALITY LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996)); see also
David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Family Issues in
the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 526 (1999) (noting that the Hawaii opinion “stirred
by far the most attention, for it led to the first appellate decision in the United States suggesting
that same-sex couples were constitutionally entitled to marry and produced a seismic political
reaction in Hawaii and the mainland”); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality,
Workplace Inequality: The Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2015)
(“[W]hen the Hawaii Supreme Court shocked the nation in 1993 and ruled in favor of Nina
Baehr’s petition to marry her female partner in Baehr v. Lewin, the issue of same-sex marriage
drew prominent national attention.” (footnote omitted)).
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licenses.43 When their applications were denied, the couples filed suit,
arguing that Hawaii’s marriage law, which “restrict[ed] the marital relation
to a male and a female,”44 was in violation of Hawaii’s constitution.45 The
trial court dismissed the case.46 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i,
however, the court ruled that, although there was no fundamental right to
same-sex marriage, under the Hawaii Constitution, “[s]ex is a ‘suspect
category’ for purposes of equal protection analysis.”47 For that reason, the
court held that the state’s discriminatory definition of marriage was
presumptively unconstitutional, and the state could only rebut that
presumption by a showing that “(a) the statute’s sex-based classification is
justified by compelling state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn
to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the applicant couples’ constitutional
rights.”48
On remand, Circuit Court of Hawai‘i Judge Kevin S. C. Chang ruled that
the state failed to rebut the presumption and issued an injunction that
prevented the state from denying licenses solely because the applicants were
of the same sex.49 Thus, in 1996, Hawaii seemed poised to become the first
state to recognize same-sex marriage. However, pending appeal, Judge
Chang issued a stay of his order, and that appeal was subsequently mooted
in 1998 when Hawaii voters passed a constitutional amendment providing
that “[t]he legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to oppositesex couples.”50 Americans did not know it at the time, but it would be
another eight years before a state would legalize same-sex marriage, and it
would not be Hawaii.51
Nonetheless, the fact that Hawaii had even considered legalizing same-sex
marriage caused great consternation among many of the other states and the
response was swift.52 With the assumption that same-sex marriages
performed in one state would potentially be entitled to full faith and credit in
all others,53 many states took what they hoped would be preemptive action
43. See Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 506 (1994)
(“In December 1990, three same-sex couples—Ninia Baehr and Genora Dancel, Tammy
Rodrigues and Antoinette Pregil, and Pat Lagon and Joseph Melilio—applied to Hawaii’s
Department of Health for marriage licenses.”).
44. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U.S. 644 (2015).
45. Id. at 49–50.
46. Id. at 52.
47. Id. at 67.
48. Id.
49. See generally Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91–1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (unpublished table decision), and rev’d, 994
P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999), No. 20371, 1999 WL 35643448 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999) (unpublished
table decision).
50. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
51. See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
52. See Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1157 (2009) (noting how events in Hawaii
“ignited the national backlash against same-sex marriage”).
53. See Brian H. Bix, State Interest and Marriage—the Theoretical Perspective, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 105–06 (2003) (“[T]he combination of national citizenship (as enforced
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and began the process of amending their constitutions to define marriage as
being between one man and one woman.54 The hope was that, in so doing, a
state could refuse to recognize “marriages” that did not comply. Eventually,
thirty-one states passed such amendments.55 Alabama, for example, passed
the Sanctity of Marriage Amendment,56 which provided that “[t]he State of
Alabama shall not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex
that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result of the law of any
jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage license was issued.”57 Voters
in the state passed the amendment with 81 percent voting in favor.58
As political pressure mounted, Congress became involved and, in 1996,
passed DOMA.59 The Act had two main purposes.60 The first was to declare
that no state would be required to recognize same-sex marriages performed
in other states.61 Second, DOMA provided that, when it came to federal law
“the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”62 In other words, to the
extent federal law conditioned marriage benefits on whether the couple was
married in their state of residence, the federal government would exclude any
same-sex marriages a state might recognize. Congress took this step even

by the Full Faith and Credit Clause) and the usual rules of recognizing marriages validly
celebrated in another state, meant that . . . there was a fear . . . that all other states would have
to recognize same-sex unions celebrated in Hawaii.” (footnote omitted)).
54. See William Buss & Emily Buss, Escaping the American Blot?: A Comparative Look
at Federalism in Australia and the United States Through the Lens of Family Law, 48
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 105, 133 n.151 (2015) (“Within twelve years of the Hawaii Supreme
Court’s ruling, many states, including Hawaii, had added an express ban on same-sex marriage
to their laws, and a majority of these prohibitions were ultimately adopted as constitutional
amendments.”); Julie L. Davies, State Regulation of Same-Sex Marriage, 7 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 1079, 1080 (2006) (“Following the first failure of a statute banning marriage for same-sex
couples in Hawaii, states began turning to state constitutional amendments to restrict
marriage.”).
55. Kenneth P. Miller, Defining Rights in the States: Judicial Activism and Popular
Response, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2061, 2087–88 (2013) (“Over time, voters in thirty-one states have
approved constitutional amendments expressly limiting the definition of marriage to a union
between a man and a woman or, in Hawaii’s case, authorizing the legislature to do so.”).
56. ALA. CONST. amend. 774.
57. Id. art. I, § 36.03(e).
58. See Dave Woods, Note, Crosspollination of Same-Sex Parental Rights Post-DOMA:
The Subtle Solution, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1651, 1677 (2014).
59. Mark A. Tumeo, Civil Rights for Gays and Lesbians and Domestic Partner Benefits:
How Far Could an Ohio Municipality Go?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 169 (2002) (“In 1996,
the United States Congress capitulated to political pressure from the conservative religious
right and passed the Defense of Marriage Act . . . .”).
60. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 752 (2013) (noting that “DOMA contains
two operative sections”).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (“No State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship between persons
of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State.”).
62. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
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though at that time, same-sex marriage was not recognized anywhere in the
United States.63
Nonetheless, just as events in Hawaii galvanized efforts to block
nationwide marriage equality, members of the LGBTQIA+ community
began to hope that something many of them had assumed would never
happen in their lifetimes might instead become a reality.64 As a result, after
losing in Hawaii, a number of activists began to target other states. Just one
year after Hawaii passed its constitutional amendment, those advocates
scored a new victory when Vermont ruled that its prohibition on same-sex
marriage violated the state’s constitution, ordering the legislature “to
consider and enact legislation consistent with” the Common Benefits Clause
of the state constitution.65 The court did note, however, that “[w]hether this
ultimately takes the form of inclusion within the marriage laws themselves
or a parallel ‘domestic partnership’ system or some equivalent statutory
alternative, rests with the Legislature.”66 In 2000, the Vermont legislature
would adopt the latter approach, making Vermont—if not the first state to
allow same-sex marriage—the first to institute civil unions for same-sex
partners.67
After Vermont, progress toward legalized same-sex marriage slowed for a
few years. Then, in 2003, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lawrence
v. Texas.68 On its face, the case merely concerned the constitutionality of
Texas’s sodomy law, which criminalized homosexual but not heterosexual
sodomy—a law that, according to the Court, implicated “liberty of the person
both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”69 Basing its
decision on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court ruled that the law was unconstitutional. In so ruling,
the Court noted that “the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason

63. See Tritt, supra note 26, at 880–81 (“Notably, at the time DOMA was enacted, neither
same-sex marriage nor polygamous marriage was legal in any state, territory, or possession of
the United States.” (footnote omitted)).
64. See Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and
Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1092 (2014) (noting that the Hawaii decision
“provided a glimmer of hope for same-sex couples that their country, or at least their state,
might recognize their relationships in their lifetimes”); Tina C. Campbell, Comment, The
“Determination of Marriage Act”: A Reasonable Response to the Discriminatory “Defense
of Marriage Act,” 58 LOY. L. REV. 939, 946 (2012) (noting that “Baehr v. Lewin brought hope
to the same-sex marriage movement”).
65. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999). The clause provides: “That government
is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people,
nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person,
family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community.” VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
66. Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
67. An Act Relating to Civil Unions, No. 91, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72 (codified in
relevant part at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2021)).
68. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
69. Id. at 562.
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for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,”70 explicitly overruling its
earlier decision71 in Bowers v. Hardwick.72
The Court was careful to try to limit the reach of Lawrence. In fact, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion went so far as to proclaim that “[t]he present case does
not . . . involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”73 To that point,
however, Justice Scalia dissented, saying, “Do not believe it.”74 He
continued:
Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has
permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual
unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate state interest” for
purposes of proscribing that conduct; and if, . . . “[w]hen sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,” what
justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to
homosexual couples exercising “[t]he liberty protected by the
Constitution?”75

Justice Scalia was not the only one to interpret the Lawrence majority opinion
in this manner. Shortly after the opinion was released, a case summary in the
Harvard Law Review had this to say about the opinion: “Lawrence suggests
that remaining forms of government-sanctioned anti-gay discrimination—
including laws barring same-sex marriage, gay adoption, and service in the
armed forces by gays and lesbians who acknowledge their sexual
orientation—must either be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
government purpose or be invalidated.”76
In fact, just a few months after Lawrence was issued, Massachusetts would
become the first state to formally extend marriage equality to same-sex
couples.77 In its 2003 decision, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,78
the state’s highest court ruled that “barring an individual from the
70. Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
71. Id. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.
It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.”).
72. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
73. Id.; see also John G. Culhane, Marriage, Tort, and Private Ordering: Rhetoric and
Reality in LGBT Rights, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 437, 461 (2009) (“For all of its affirming
language and sympathetic tone, though, Lawrence also reiterates—via needless dictum—that
the case is not about marriage.”).
74. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 604–05 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 567, 578
(majority opinion)).
76. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 298 (2003).
77. See Douglas Nejaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital
Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 166 (2014) (describing
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision as “the first state supreme court decision
opening marriage to same-sex couples”).
78. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that
person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts
Constitution.”79 In so ruling, the court quoted Lawrence: “Our obligation is
to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”80 When it
came to fashioning a remedy, the court did not strike down Massachusetts’s
existing marriage laws but instead borrowed an approach from the highest
court in Ontario, Canada, which held: “[T]he appropriate remedy . . . . is to
declare invalid the existing definition of marriage to the extent that it refers
to ‘one man and one woman,’ and to reformulate the definition of marriage
as ‘the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all
others.’”81 Unlike Vermont, the Massachusetts court did not give the
legislature the option of creating civil unions and, on May 17, 2004,
Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.82
Now that one state had officially extended the right to marry to same-sex
couples, more states began to pass constitutional amendments aimed at
insulating them from having to recognize same-sex marriages performed in
other states. That would not stop other states, however, from following
Massachusetts’s lead. In 2008, the highest courts in Connecticut83 and
California84 likewise ruled that the state constitutions protected the right of
same-sex couples to wed. In so ruling, the Connecticut high court rejected
civil unions as an option for curing the constitutional violation: “Although
marriage and civil unions do embody the same legal rights under our law,
they are by no means equal. The former is an institution of transcendent
historical, cultural and social significance, whereas the latter is not.”85 The
following year, the Supreme Court of Iowa would do the same, making it the
first midwestern state to do so.86 Later that year, Vermont earned the
79. Id. at 969.
80. Id. at 948 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571).
81. Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.) (2003), 65 O.R. 3d 161, paras. 144–48 (Can. Ont.
C.A.) (emphasis added) (quoting Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) 1 LRP & D 130 at
133 (Eng.)). The Goodridge court “concur[red] with this remedy, which is entirely consonant
with established principles of jurisprudence empowering a court to refine a common-law
principle in light of evolving constitutional standards.” Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969.
82. See Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005)
(“For the plaintiff couples in the Goodridge case, May 17 was the most important day of their
lives . . . . Others, too, were overwhelmed by the power of the government to acknowledge
our humanity and our citizenship.”).
83. See generally Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
84. See generally In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). California would,
however, cease issuing marriage licenses in November of that year after voters passed
Proposition 8, which amended the California’s constitution to define marriage as involving
one man and one woman. See Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for
Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1297 (2010) (“The court, however, left intact the
roughly eighteen thousand marriages that had occurred between the Marriage Cases decision
and the passage of Proposition 8.”). Same-sex marriage would not resume in California until
2013, when the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S.
693 (2013), which let stand the district court’s ruling that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.
Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 709 (holding that appellants lacked standing to appeal the district
court’s opinion).
85. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418.
86. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
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distinction of becoming the first state to legalize same-sex marriage not
because the state’s highest court demanded it but through legislation—
legislation that would define marriage as “the legally recognized union of
two people.”87 From 2009 to 2012, three other states and the District of
Columbia would likewise pass legislation extending the right to marry to
same-sex couples.88
Although same-sex marriage had thus far involved questions of state law,
the issue would take on federal constitutional dimensions in 2013 when the
Supreme Court struck down section 3 of DOMA, which precluded same-sex
spouses from qualifying for federal marriage benefits.89 The case was United
States v. Windsor90 and involved a same-sex couple, Edith Windsor and Thea
Spyer, who had been in a relationship since 1963.91 The two women, who
lived in New York, where they registered as domestic partners in 1993, were
married in Canada in 2007.92 In 2009, Spyer died, leaving her estate to
Windsor.93 Had Windsor been male, she could have taken advantage of the
marital exemption for federal estate tax, but because she was female, DOMA
denied her that marital benefit, forcing her to pay over $300,000 in estate
taxes.94 Thus, Windsor argued that DOMA was unconstitutional, and the
Supreme Court agreed, ruling that section 3 was unconstitutional and
characterizing it as violative of “basic due process and equal protection
principles applicable to the Federal Government.”95 The Court observed:
DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to
recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty. It imposes a
disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds
to be dignified and proper. DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed
all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own
children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.96

87. An Act Relating to Civil Marriages, No. 3, § 5, 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 33, 33
(codified in relevant part at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2021)). Previously, this provision had
read: “Marriage is the legally recognized union of one man and one woman.” See An Act
Relating to Civil Unions, No. 91, § 25, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72, 82; Calvin Massey,
Public Opinion, Cultural Change, and Constitutional Adjudication, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1437,
1448 n.47 (2010).
88. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 693 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(identifying Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, and Washington, D.C.).
89. Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996), invalidated by United States
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); see supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
90. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
91. Id. at 753.
92. Id. Despite the fact they married in Canada, New York did recognize the validity of
their marriage. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (“Because DOMA denies federal recognition to same-sex spouses, Windsor did
not qualify for the marital exemption from the federal estate tax.”).
95. Id. at 769.
96. Id. at 775.
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The Court concluded that “[b]y seeking to displace this protection and
treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the
federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”97
On the heels of Windsor, the marriage equality movement gained
considerable steam. In his 2014 opinion in favor of marriage equality, Judge
Richard Gergel of the District of South Carolina noted that “[i]n the
approximately 17 months since the Windsor decision, federal courts in
virtually every circuit and in every state with a same sex marriage ban have
heard lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of such state law
provisions.”98 A majority of those courts, including four federal circuit
courts of appeals, would ultimately rule in favor of same-sex couples looking
to marry.99 Notably, however, one appellate court—the Sixth Circuit—
reached the opposite conclusion and overturned lower court decisions in
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee.100 In late 2014, the Sixth Circuit
issued its opinion, essentially holding that the voters and not the courts should
decide the issue of same-sex marriage—an approach the dissent
characterized as failing “to grapple with the relevant constitutional
question.”101 That decision was DeBoer v. Snyder,102 but once the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, it would be consolidated with another case and given
a new name: Obergefell v. Hodges.
The Court would use Obergefell to finally address the larger question of
whether a state may constitutionally prohibit same-sex marriage.103
Although the Court had previously held that “the right to marry is protected
by the Constitution,”104 the precedent cases in which that right had developed
all involved laws that had clearly “presumed a relationship involving
opposite-sex partners.”105 Nonetheless, in his majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy held that an analysis of those opinions “compels the conclusion that
same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.”106 Specifically, the Court
identified four essential “principles and traditions” related to marriage that
justified its classification as a fundamental right—principles and traditions
that, according to the Court, “apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”107

97. Id. According to the Court, “the Fifth Amendment . . . withdraws from Government
the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does.” Id. at 774.
98. Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 582 (D.S.C. 2014).
99. Carl Tobias, Marriage Equality Comes to the Fourth Circuit, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
2005, 2008 (2018) (“The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits affirmed district invalidations.”).
100. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 413 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Obergefell v.
Hodges 576 U.S. 644 (2015); see also Watts, supra note 17, at S68–S69.
101. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 421 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
102. 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644.
103. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 651.
104. Id. at 664.
105. Id. at 665. The Court did acknowledge, however, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810
(1972). See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. Obergefell, of course, overruled
Baker. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675.
106. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 665.
107. Id.
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First, going back to its decision in Loving, the Court noted that “the right
to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy,”108 recognizing that “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two
men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such
profound choices.”109 Second, according to the Court, marriage is a
fundamental right because the institution “supports a two-person union
unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”110 Third,
the Court held that marriage “safeguards children and families and thus draws
meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”111
Citing Windsor, where the Court noted how laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage “harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples,”112 the
Court explained that “[b]y giving recognition and legal structure to their
parents’ relationship, marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity
and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their
community and in their daily lives.’”113 Finally, the Court justified the
fundamental nature of the right to marry, noting that marriage is “the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress.”114
Having distilled the right to marry into those four components, each
justifying its recognition as a fundamental right, the Court found no basis for
excluding same-sex couples from that right:
Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage
and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of
the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. With that knowledge must
come the recognition that laws excluding same-sex couples from the
marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic
charter.115

Accordingly, the Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibits states from
denying same-sex couples the ability to marry on terms equal to those of
opposite-sex couples, paving the way for same-sex couples around the
country to immediately begin exercising their constitutional right to marry—
something many of them had waited decades to do.116
108. Id.
109. Id. at 666 (“The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons
together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.”).
110. Id. As the Court explained, marriage “offers the hope of companionship and
understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the
other.” Id. at 667.
111. Id. (first citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); and then citing
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
112. Id. at 668 (citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)).
113. Id. at 668 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)); id.
(“Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important to children’s best interests.”).
114. Id. at 669 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
115. Id. at 670–71.
116. Id. at 671–72.
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II. OBERGEFELL AND PRE-EQUALITY “MARRIAGES”
At its most basic level, Obergefell permitted same-sex couples to
prospectively enter into formal marriages. What it did not do was give legal
effect to the relationships they had entered into years earlier when marriage
was not an option.117 Thus, the question arises whether those couples are
entitled to any credit for the time they spent waiting for marriage equality
and, if so, how such credit is to be determined. After all, Obergefell made
clear that same-sex couples were not only entitled to the right to wed but were
likewise entitled to do so “on the same terms and conditions” as opposite-sex
couples.118 Just two years after Obergefell, the Court issued Pavan v.
Smith,119 a per curiam order in which a majority reiterated that same
understanding when it characterized Obergefell as being committed “to
provide same-sex couples ‘the constellation of benefits that the States have
linked to marriage.’”120
As the remainder of this part makes clear, however, there are a number of
marital benefits that would have accrued to those in same-sex relationships
if not for the unconstitutional denial of their right to wed. Thus, failure to
count the years same-sex couples spent in an informal marriage-like state
would undermine Obergefell’s promise of “liberty and equality under the
Constitution.”121 After discussing several of the marital benefits that fall into
this category, this part then looks to the disparate approaches states have
taken when confronted with the issue of whether to “backdate” marriages for
same-sex couples.
A. Benefits Conditioned on Length of Marriage
This Article began by discussing Michael Ely’s pursuit of Social Security
benefits, which is but one of the “constellation of benefits” tied to length of
marriage.122 In their case, the Social Security Administration had refused to
recognize Ely as a surviving spouse given that he was unable to satisfy the
Social Security Act’s requirement that he be married to the insured for nine
months.123 Other federal benefits have similar restrictions. For instance, the
statute governing pension benefits for surviving spouses of federal
employees has the same nine-month marriage requirement.124 Additionally,
the federal statute that deals with pension benefits for surviving spouses of
military veterans withholds eligibility “unless such surviving spouse was
117. See Rhodes, supra note 26, at 433 (“The Supreme Court could have exceeded the
presented issues and ordered remedial backdating in Obergefell as a constitutional
minimum—but it did not.”).
118. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 676.
119. 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
120. Id. at 2077 (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670).
121. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 674.
122. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077 (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670); see also Ely
Complaint, supra note 8.
123. And this is but one of the Social Security benefits tied to length of marriage. For an
excellent discussion of others, see Nicolas, supra note 26, at 408–12.
124. See 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A).
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married to such veteran . . . before the expiration of fifteen years after the
termination of the period of service in which the injury or disease causing the
death of the veteran was incurred or aggravated; or . . . for one year or
more.”125 Beyond benefits related to surviving spouses, federal law likewise
imposes length-of-marriage restrictions in the area of immigration law. For
instance, one can petition to have a spouse classified as an immediate relative
only after “the alien has resided outside the United States for a 2-year period
beginning after the date of the marriage.”126
At the state level, there are additional benefits that are conditioned on
being married for a certain amount of time. In Arkansas, for instance, a
surviving spouse’s ability to take an elective share is conditioned on having
“been married to the decedent continuously for a period in excess of one (1)
year.”127 Similarly, a number of other states calculate the amount of the
elective share by looking at how long the parties were married.128 A number
of states condition certain divorce protections on the length of the marriage.
For instance, when it comes to the decision of whether to award alimony and
in what amount, some states have statutes requiring courts to consider the
length of the marriage.129 Indeed, in the absence of a statutory directive,
several states have held that there is a rebuttable presumption of permanent
alimony if the marriage was “long-term.”130 Many states also consider the
length of the marriage when determining property distribution.131 A divorce
statute in Washington, for instance, directs that “the court shall . . . make such
disposition of the property and the liabilities of the parties . . . after

125. 38 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)–(2); see also id. §§ 1304, 1541(f).
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(g) (emphasis added).
127. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-401(a) (2020). The term “elective share” comes from
“state law [that] gives surviving spouses the right to make claims against their deceased
spouses’ estates, even if the deceased spouses explicitly disinherited them.” Laura A.
Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1245.
128. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 524.2-202 (2020).
129. See, e.g., Lyudmila Workman, Alimony Demographics, 20 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
109, 110 (2011) (“Length of marriage is one significant factor in determining the distribution
of alimony awards.”).
130. See id. (discussing a study that found “that women who had been housewives in
marriages lasting 10 years or more were much more likely to be awarded support than those
in marriages of less than five years, and that the likelihood of receiving alimony increased
proportionately to the length of the underlying marriage”); see also Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of
Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 317, 341 (2016) (noting that “many states
now restrict permanent alimony to long-term marriages”).
131. See, e.g., Impullitti v. Impullitti, 415 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987);
(“Factors to be considered in the division are the property’s source, contribution towards its
acquisition, length of the marriage, and the needs and earning capacities of the parties.”);
Swanson v. Swanson, 921 N.W.2d 666, 670 (N.D. 2019) (“A long-term marriage generally
supports an equal property distribution.”); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81 (2020) (“In
fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court . . . shall consider
[among other things] the length of the marriage.”); IOWA CODE § 598.21 (2020) (“The court
shall divide all property, except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one party,
equitably between the parties after considering [among other things]: a. The length of the
marriage.”).
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considering all relevant factors including . . . [t]he duration of the marriage
or domestic partnership.”132
Beyond absolute length of marriage, many marital benefits at the state
level are conditioned on whether the parties were married during the
occurrence of certain events. One of the most notable examples relates to
property distribution. Upon divorce, the majority of states equitably divide
a couple’s marital property between the two parties but not each spouse’s
separate property, which remains with the spouse who owns it.133
Determining whether particular property qualifies as marital or separate
typically relates to when that property was acquired—if before marriage, it
is separate; if during the marriage, it is marital.134 For an economically
dependent spouse, this distinction can be crucial, especially if the most
valuable property is ultimately declared the separate property of the other
spouse.
To illustrate, consider a same-sex couple who entered into a committed
relationship in 2005. The two would have married had they had the right to
do so but instead were forced to wait until 2015, when Obergefell finally
ushered in marriage equality. The two immediately married but then
divorced three years later. In many states, any property the two had acquired
between 2005 and 2015 would be considered separate and, thus, not subject
to division upon divorce. Had the couple been permitted to wed in 2005,
however, that same property would have likely been classified as divisible,
marital property. Similar marital benefits that are conditioned on the parties
being married at a certain point in time include the marital privilege, which
protects only communications made between two people who were married
at the time of the communication;135 the ability to bring a claim for loss of
132. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080(3) (2020).
133. See ANN LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
713 (2019) (“Most states are ‘marital property’ states, which require the divorce court to
classify the property owned by the spouses at the time of divorce as either marital or separate,
and then authorize the court to divide all marital property.”). Community property states
follow a similar approach but label the property acquired during marriage as “community
property,” a designation that influences the “management and use” of that property not only
when the marriage ends but during the marriage as well. Id. at 714. A minority of states follow
the “hotchpot” approach, whereby all property is subject to division regardless of when it was
acquired. Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?: An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 836 n.76 (2005) (noting that only fourteen
states “permit[] the division of premarital assets”).
134. There are typically exceptions, however, for property acquired during marriage as a
result of inheritance or gift. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-213 (2020) (“A spouse’s
real and personal property that is owned by that spouse before marriage and that is acquired
by that spouse during the marriage by gift, devise or descent, . . . is the separate property of
that spouse.” (emphasis added)); see also Carla M. Roberts, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright
as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053, 1059–60 (1991) (“Separate property typically
is anything an individual owned prior to entering a marriage, income received from separate
property, and property received by descent, devise, or gift during the marriage.”).
135. See Steven A. Young, Note, Retroactive Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage for the
Purposes of the Confidential Marital Communications Privilege, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
319, 330 (2016) (“[I]t is critically important that the privilege requires ‘spouses,’ meaning the
two parties must be married at the time the communication was made.”).
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consortium, which requires the claimant to have been married to the injured
party at the time of the injury;136 and the marital presumption, which
presumes the spouse of a mother is the child’s second parent but only if the
two were married when she gave birth.137
At the same time, one cannot lose sight of the marital benefits tied to the
very fact of marriage and how the availability of those benefits has impacted
same-sex relationships that predated marriage equality. For instance, there
are a number of individuals living today who never formalized their samesex relationships simply because their partners died before they were legally
permitted to wed. For those survivors, the timing of their partners’ deaths
caused significant legal harm. Consider, for instance, Helen Thornton and
Margery Brown, who were in a committed relationship in Washington for
twenty-seven years.138 The two women met in 1979, and their relationship
lasted until 2006, when Brown died of cancer.139 Given that same-sex
marriage was not permitted in Washington State until 2012, the two women
were unable to marry.140 Accordingly, when Thornton filed for Social
Security benefits as a surviving spouse, her application was denied.141
In addition, there are a number of same-sex relationships that the parties
dissolved prior to marriage equality. The potential harm to individuals in
those relationships stems from the fact that, had they been permitted to marry,
those relationships might have been marital and thus could only have been
dissolved in accordance with the protections afforded by the states’ divorce
laws. For example, in 2004, Kimberly Sutton proposed marriage to Charlene
Ramey.142 The Oklahoma couple spent the next eight and a half years living
together and holding themselves out as a committed couple.143 The two even
agreed to become parents.144 Using artificial insemination, Kimberly
became pregnant and gave birth to a son in 2005.145 Nonetheless, Kimberly
acknowledged Charlene as the child’s other parent.146 In fact, Charlene
served as primary caregiver to the child, who referred to Charlene as

136. See infra notes 156–64 and accompanying text.
137. See Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 662 (2014) (“Long before paternity tests were available, in other
words, the marital presumption assumed that married women did not bear children fathered
by men other than their husbands.”); see also infra note 150 and accompanying text.
138. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive & Other Relief at 2, Thornton v. Berryhill, No.
18-1409, 2020 WL 5494891 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2020).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217, 220 (Okla. 2015) (“Ramey . . . wore a diamond ring
to reflect their mutual commitment.”).
143. Id. at 219.
144. Id.
145. Id. Although “[a] friend of the couple agreed to be the donor,” the court noted that
“[t]he donor understood and agreed that Ramey and Sutton would co-parent and raise any
child conceived as their own and that he did not have any obligations.” Id. at 219 n.4.
146. Id. at 219 (“Sutton prepared a baby book for their child identifying both Sutton and
Ramey as parents. Sutton gave a card to Ramey congratulating her on becoming a ‘mother’
to their son and that she would be a wonderful mom.”).
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“mom.”147 Likewise, the trio held themselves out to friends and relatives as
a family.148
When the relationship between the two women ultimately ended,
Kimberly argued that Charlene was not entitled to custody or visitation, given
that she was not a biological parent and the two had never married.149 Had
the two wed at any point prior to dissolving their relationship, there would
have been no question that Charlene was a legal parent.150 Charlene did
ultimately prevail, but it was not because the court was willing to consider
the quality of the relationship during a time when marriage was an
impossibility. Instead, the court ruled that, “although the biological mother
enjoys many rights as a parent, it does not include the right to erase a
relationship that she voluntarily created and fostered with their child.”151
Thus, for the LGBTQIA+ Americans who were lucky enough to have lived
to see marriage equality become the law of the land, they still face
discrimination when it comes to receiving “the same terms and conditions”
as different-sex couples.152 Specifically, individuals today who were in
same-sex relationships that would have been marriages had the law not
prevented them from formalizing their unions are being denied a number of
protective benefits. Although these benefits are likewise denied to differentsex couples whose relationships ended before they could marry or who spent
years cohabitating prior to formal marriages, there is a key difference: for
same-sex couples, marriage was a legal impossibility.
B. State Responses
The concept of formal marriage equality is still relatively new and, as such,
there are a number of questions regarding the reach of Obergefell with which
the law must still grapple.153 Justice Kennedy’s equal protection analysis,
for instance, did little to illuminate the standard of review that applies to

147. Id. The child would not refer to Kimberly as her mother “until the age of five or six.”
Id. (“Even today, their child will sometimes refer to Sutton, the biological mom as Kimberly
and not as ‘mom.’”).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-204 (2021) (stating that “[a] man is presumed to be the
father of a child if . . . [h]e and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child
is born during the marriage”). Although the statute is written in gendered terms, the Supreme
Court has ruled that a state cannot extend the marital presumption to different-sex marriages
without also extending it to same-sex marriages. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078
(2017).
151. Ramey, 362 P.3d at 221. In ruling for Ramey, however, the court did note that “[t]he
couple’s failure to marry cannot now be used as a means to further deprive the nonbiological
parent, who has acted in loco parentis, of a best interests of the child hearing.” Id. at 220–21.
152. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 676 (2015).
153. Craig Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope: Toward a Theory of Interpreting Precedents,
94 N.C. L. REV. 379, 467 (2016) (noting that Obergefell “resolved doctrinal debates over
same-sex marriage, but . . . raised unanswered questions concerning LGBT discrimination,
polygamy, and other forms of constitutional liberty”).
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.154 What does seem clear,
however, in the wake of both Obergefell and Pavan is that whatever marital
benefits a state extends to different-sex couples, it must likewise extend to
same-sex couples. The question arises, however, as to how states are to
apportion marital benefits to same-sex couples who were prohibited by law
from marrying. Since Obergefell, the issue has arisen in a variety of contexts
and, not surprisingly, the states have taken a number of different approaches.
Even before Obergefell, the Supreme Court of Connecticut became one of
the earliest courts to rule that same-sex couples are entitled to marital benefits
if—but for the prohibition against same-sex marriage—they would have wed
at an earlier date. In Mueller v. Tepler,155 Margaret Mueller and Charlotte
Stacey were in a longtime relationship that began in 1985.156 In 2001,
Margaret’s physician diagnosed and subsequently treated her for ovarian
cancer when, in fact, she was suffering from cancer of the appendix.157 Left
untreated, Margaret’s cancer progressed to the point where surgery was no
longer an option, and she died in 2009.158 In 2006, however, she brought a
medical malpractice claim, which included a claim by Charlotte for loss of
consortium.159 The defendants moved to strike Charlotte’s claim on the basis
that, at the time of the alleged negligence, she and Margaret were not married,
as required by the state’s law regarding loss of consortium claims.160
Although the two did enter into a civil union in 2005 pursuant to Connecticut
law, the plaintiffs had alleged that the medical malpractice occurred before
that date.161
Nonetheless, the court ruled that the requirement that the plaintiff must
have been married to the injured party at the time of the injury “only has
logical force . . . if the couple was capable of entering into a ‘formal marriage
relation’ prior to the injury.”162 Because that option was not available to
Margaret and Charlotte, the court expanded the ability to bring a loss of
consortium claim “to members of couples who were not married when the
tortious conduct occurred, but who would have been married if the marriage
154. See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Reconstruction, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 937, 985 (2020)
(“[T]he Court appeared to apply something more rigorous than traditional rational basis
review, [but] never articulated a standard of review.”).
155. 95 A.3d 1011 (Conn. 2014).
156. Id. at 1015.
157. Id. (noting that the doctor “either failed to review the pathology report or
misinterpreted its findings”).
158. Id. (“Although the error was discovered in April, 2005, Mueller’s cancer had
progressed to a stage where some of the tumors no longer could be removed surgically.”).
159. Id.
160. Id.; see also Gurliacci v. Mayer, 590 A.2d 914, 931–32 (Conn. 1991) (“[V]irtually all
of the jurisdictions that have considered the question take the position that ‘[a]n action for loss
of consortium cannot be maintained unless the plaintiff was married to the injured person at
the time of the actionable conduct.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Briggs v.
Butterfield Mem’l Hosp., 479 N.Y.S.2d 758, 758 (App. Div. 1984))).
161. Mueller, 95 A.3d at 1015. The court did note, however, that the two were not
permitted to enter into the civil union until a year after the doctor had stopped treating
Margaret. Id. at 1015 n.4.
162. Id. at 1017 (quoting plaintiff’s objection to defendants’ motion to strike).
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had not been barred by state law.”163 In light of that expansion, the court
remanded the case to determine whether the women’s relationship met that
test.164
The following year, an Oregon court adopted a similar test. There, Karah
and Lorrena Madrone held a commitment ceremony in 2005.165 Two years
later, the two women decided to have a child by artificial insemination and
Lorrena agreed to carry the child.166 Afterwards, the two women both
changed their last names to Madrone and registered as domestic partners
pursuant to Oregon law.167 The relationship between the women
“deteriorated” and in 2012, Karah filed for a dissolution of the domestic
partnership.168 She also sought a declaration that she was the legal parent of
the child born to Lorrena.169 Karah did so by relying on an Oregon statute
that provided that a husband of a woman who conceives by artificial
insemination is presumed (assuming he consented to the insemination) to be
the legal father.170 Although Oregon courts had previously extended the
statute’s protections to same-sex partners,171 Lorrena objected on the basis
that the two women did not enter into a domestic partnership until after the
child was born.172 The court rejected her argument, however, and held that
“choice is the key to determining whether [the Oregon statute] applies to a
particular same-sex couple.”173 The court further opined:
Given that same-sex couples were until recently prohibited from choosing
to be married, the test for whether a same-sex couple is similarly situated
to the married opposite-sex couple contemplated in [the statute] cannot be
whether the same-sex couple chose to be married or not. Rather, the salient
question is whether the same-sex partners would have chosen to marry
before the child’s birth had they been permitted to.174

For those reasons, the case was remanded to determine whether the “couple
would have married had that choice been available.”175
163. Id. at 1023.
164. Id. at 1030–31.
165. In re Madrone, 350 P.3d 495, 497 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 498 n.1.
168. Id. at 497–98.
169. Id. at 498 (“Petitioner alleged that, at the time of R’s conception and birth, she was
respondent’s ‘domestic and life partner,’ that she and respondent had planned the pregnancy
with the intent to raise the child together, and that she had consented to the artificial
insemination procedure.”).
170. Id. at 498 (noting the statute provides the same rights to the mother’s husband “as if
the child had been naturally and legitimately conceived by the mother and the mother’s
husband” (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2018))).
171. See Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (extending “the statute
so that it applies when the same-sex partner of the biological mother consented to the artificial
insemination”).
172. In re Madrone, 350 P.3d at 499 (quoting Lorrena’s argument that “the protections
afforded in [the Oregon statute] apply to domestic partners, not simply people in a
relationship”).
173. Id. at 501.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 502.
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The Connecticut and Oregon cases both arose in states where same-sex
couples, even before they obtained the right to marry, had the option of
entering into civil unions or domestic partnerships. Since Obergefell, many
of those states have adopted legislation concerning how time spent in these
“alternative species of quasi-marriage”176 will count toward the length of the
marriage. Specifically, as Professor Peter Nicolas explains, seven states that
permitted same-sex couples to enter into domestic partnerships or civil
unions pre-Obergefell have since “created a seamless mechanism for
converting civil unions or domestic partnerships to marriages.”177 Of those,
about half have legislated that the marriage began on the date the relationship
was converted to a formal marriage, while the remainder set the date as the
time the couple first entered into the domestic partnership or civil union.178
Although the latter approach allows the same-sex couple to count more of
their actual relationship toward the subsequent marriage, it still only applies
to those portions that came after the couple entered into the domestic
partnership or civil union—legal options that may not have been available
until after the couple had already been in a relationship for many years.
Nonetheless, such an approach is still superior to that being taken in states
that fail to even offer civil unions or domestic partnerships. In the few cases
that have arisen in those states, courts have simply refused to grant marital
benefits to same-sex couples whose relationships spanned time periods in
which they were prohibited from marrying. Consider, for instance, a
Michigan case involving two women, Deanna and Johanna Mabry, who were
in a relationship that began in 1995 and lasted until 2010.179 During that
time, the two bought a house together and participated in a commitment
ceremony, and Johanna even took Deanna’s last name.180 Most relevant to
the subsequent litigation, however, was the fact that the relationship
produced three children.181 Johanna was the biological mother, having
conceived using an anonymous donor.182 Nonetheless, Deanna’s role in the
children’s lives was “significant” in that she “provided [them] with health
insurance, she was the sole financial provider for the family, and she
provided care and guidance to the children.”183 In fact, Johanna’s will
176. Andersen v. King County, No. 04–2–04964–4, 2004 WL 1738447, at *12 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004), rev’d, 158 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
177. Nicolas, supra note 26, at 405.
178. Id. at 405–06; Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.100(4) (2020) (“[T]he date of the
original state registered domestic partnership is the legal date of the marriage.”), with 15 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-13 (2020) (“For purposes of determining the legal rights and
responsibilities involving [married] individuals who previously entered into a civil union in
this state, . . . the date of the recording of the marriage certificate shall be the operative date
by which legal rights and responsibilities are determined.”).
179. Mabry v. Mabry, 882 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Mich. 2016) (McCormack, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (observing that the two took additional steps, including “filing a declaration of
domestic partnership, . . . entering a formal domestic-partnership agreement, . . . and entering
into a marriage covenant in the form of a ketubah”).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (noting that all three children “were biological children of the defendant but took
the plaintiff’s last name and were parented by both the defendant and the plaintiff”).
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provided that, “in the event of her death, [Deanna] would be the children’s
legal guardian and conservator.”184
However, when the parties ended their relationship and Deanna petitioned
for custody, the Michigan court ruled that she lacked standing because she
was never formally married to the children’s mother.185 Unlike the courts in
Connecticut and Oregon,186 the Michigan court refused to even consider
whether the couple would have married had they been permitted to do so. A
year earlier, a court in Florida, on very similar facts, reached the same
conclusion.187 Thus, in comparison to states like Connecticut and Oregon,
states that never adopted alternatives to marriage currently appear to be more
hostile to backdating claims of those in same-sex relationships.
There is, however, one exception—the handful of states that permit
informal or common-law marriage. A survey of decisions from those states
reveals that some have been willing to offer relief by finding that the couple
had effectuated a common-law marriage. To illustrate, consider the South
Carolina case of Debra Parks, who ended a forty-year relationship with her
partner in 2017.188 During this time, the two had bought a house and “other
property together, had joint bank accounts, used each other on tax documents,
and lived together until 2016.”189 The couple resided in South Carolina,
which did not permit same-sex marriage until 2014.190 South Carolina does,
however, recognize common-law marriage.191 When Parks sued to have her
relationship declared a common-law marriage, the judge agreed.192 In
essence, the court ruled that not only had the two entered into a common-law
marriage but that it had commenced when Parks divorced her husband in
1987—twenty-seven years before South Carolina would begin allowing
same-sex marriage.193 Other states that recognize common-law marriage
have reached similar results when dealing with individuals whose same-sex
partners died before they were able to legally wed.194
184. Id.
185. Id. at 541 (“The order held that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring a custody
action pursuant to the equitable-parent doctrine because that doctrine is only available to a
parent who was married.”).
186. See supra notes 156–75 and accompanying text.
187. See generally Willis v. Mobley, 171 So. 3d 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), No. 5D14–
3424, 2015 WL 4389054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 14, 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished table
decision).
188. See Andrew Dys, Same-Sex Legal Groundbreaker: Judge Says Rock Hill Couple
Married in S.C. for Decades, HERALD (Mar. 23, 2017, 8:48 AM),
https://www.heraldonline.com/news/local/article139540723.html
[https://perma.cc/Z46QQGZZ] (reporting the facts of York County Family Court case, Parks v. Lee, 2016-DR-451061
(2016)).
189. Id. According to Parks, “We were a family, even when society didn’t accept it.” Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. According to the judge, “Quoting William Shakespeare, ‘A rose by any other name
would smell as sweet,’ . . . . The law established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell . . .
should be applied retroactively in South Carolina.” Id.
193. Id.
194. See Nicolas, supra note 26, at 416–18 (collecting cases); Young, supra note 135, at
338–43 (collecting cases).
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Because very few states permit common-law marriage, however, the vast
majority of states have had to fashion new tests for dealing with same-sex
relationships that predated marriage equality. And, as detailed earlier, those
states have done so with varying approaches and with divergent opinions as
to what true marriage equality entails. That itself is problematic, in light of
the fact that the right to marry is a constitutionally protected right.195 As
such, there necessarily must exist some standards to which all states must
adhere. Of course, family law is largely within the primary province of the
states and, as such, it would be unreasonable to expect all states to have an
identical response to this issue.196 In fact, as Professor Charles Rhodes has
pointed out, “family law courts, as a rule, traditionally have broad judicial
discretion in adjudicating disputes and fashioning just outcomes.”197
Nonetheless, because “federal constitutional rights are understood to extend
equally across the land,”198 there are limits to how divergent states can be
when it comes to resolving the issue of backdating same-sex marriage.199
Thus, a more consistent remedy is necessary if states are to redress the
harms that many individuals from same-sex relationships continue to
experience as a result of the unconstitutional laws that had long prevented
them from marrying.
III. THE LAW OF INFORMAL FAMILY CREATION
States that refuse to consider the pre-equality portion of a same-sex
couples’ relationships are producing two separate but related harms. First,
they are shortchanging individuals in same-sex marriages who seek marital
benefits tied to length of marriage.200 Second, these states completely deny
all marital benefits to those who were in same-sex relationships that ended
(either through dissolution or death) prior to the time marriage became a legal
option. Both harms run counter to the Court’s holding in Obergefell and thus
a new remedy is required.
195. See Michael J. Higdon, Polygamous Marriage, Monogamous Divorce, 67 DUKE L.J.
79, 96 (2017) (“[T]he Court has declared that, under the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to marry is a fundamental right.”).
196. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Unintended Consequences: Why Congress Should Tread
Lightly When Entering the Field of Family Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 406 (2008)
(“Leaving family law to the states, however, allows diversity to exist within the United States,
and individuals whose values differ from those of the majority in one location have the
alternative of emigrating to another, more compatible, community.”); Milton C. Regan Jr.,
Reason, Tradition, and Family Law: A Comment on Social Constructionism, 79 VA. L. REV.
1515, 1524 (1993) (“[A] cardinal tenet of United States jurisprudence is that family law is
primarily the province of individual states—a principle that explicitly invites the codification
of diverse particular judgments about how family life should be arranged.”).
197. Rhodes, supra note 26, at 432.
198. Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and
the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 169 (2009).
199. Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483, 1490 (2018)
(“[L]ike all constitutional rights, [parenthood] must necessarily possess some core limits that
bind the states.”).
200. See Nicolas, supra note 26, at 397 (“[M]any same-sex relationships appear artificially
short in endurance when measured solely by reference to the couple’s civil marriage date.”).
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In formulating an appropriate remedy, however, it is important to first
recognize that states are not starting from a blank slate when it comes to
awarding family-like benefits to individuals who lack formal family
relationships. Instead, the states already possess a number of equitable
doctrines that operate in a variety of different contexts to do just that—
doctrines that can greatly assist the courts in crafting a new remedy to protect
same-sex couples whose relationships predated marriage equality. These
existing remedies operate against a backdrop where, despite the robust legal
protections that exist for American families, there is little consensus on the
precise legal definition of “family.”201 When people talk of “starting a
family,” one typically imagines marriage and the eventual addition of
children, either through birth or adoption. The reality, however, is much
more complicated, and over the years, that complexity has only grown.202
Couples may get married or they may not. Perhaps the couple thought they
were married when, in reality, the marriage was void for some reason. The
two may have children together or they may not. Perhaps they end up raising
children who only have a biological relationship with one of them. Maybe
the nonbiological parent adopts the new children but perhaps not. Maybe
they agree to take in a child from a friend or relative and, despite an intent to
do so, never get around to formally adopting the child.
Family law is no stranger to dealing with any of these scenarios,
consistently drawing on its “built-in flexibility to adapt to changing
times.”203 And, indeed, over the years, states have developed a number of
doctrines that permit courts to extend familial rights even to those who failed
to formally create legal family relationships. What follows is a brief survey
of five different examples that courts have relied on to fashion a new remedy
for same-sex couples whose “marriages” predated the legal recognition of
their right to form such unions. In reviewing these existing doctrines, it is
important to note how the courts resort to them primarily for reasons of
equity, focusing on the need to protect parties from the harms they would
otherwise suffer were the courts to rigidly insist on form over substance.

201. Kirsten Korn, Comment, The Struggle for the Child: Preserving the Family in
Adoption Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1291
(1994) (“Although the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution protects various aspects
of the family, as well as the parent-child relationship, determining what constitutes a ‘family’
and who may be considered ‘parents’ for purposes of such protection has proved difficult.”).
202. Michael J. Higdon, The Quasi-parent Conundrum, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 941, 948–49
(2019) (discussing various social changes that have led to American families being “more
heterogeneous than ever before”).
203. Supriya Kakkar, Note, Unauthorized Embryo Transfer at the University of California,
Irvine Center for Reproductive Health, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1031 (1997); see also
Bradley G. Silverman, Federal Questions and the Domestic-Relations Exception, 125 YALE
L.J. 1364, 1392 (2016) (“Crafting a workable system of family law requires calibrating a
‘complex level of benefits’ to which state law entitles those who occupy different familial
roles.” (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Mae Kuykendall, David Upham & Michael Worley in
Support of Neither Party & Urging Affirmance on Question 1, at 15, Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U.S. 644 (2015) (No. 14-556))).
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A. Informal Marriage
Common-law marriage provides likely the most obvious example of
legally recognized family relationships that arise through informal means.
Also referred to as informal marriage, common-law marriage “is formed by
the conduct, statements, and intent of the parties to the marriage without
official involvement or formalities.”204 However, unlike the other equitable
remedies discussed below, where parties can claim some of the rights
associated with either marriage or parentage, common-law marriage results
in a legal union that carries with it the same rights and obligations of formal
marriage.205 As Judge Richard Posner explained in a 2000 opinion from the
Seventh Circuit: “The purpose of common law marriage is not to create a
second-class sort of marriage, but rather to repair unintended deficiencies in
the ceremony . . . . [and thus] a common law spouse has the same rights as
any other spouse.”206
Despite the implications of its name, common-law marriage is largely an
American invention.207 An 1809 case out of New York is commonly credited
as the first to recognize the legality of informal marriage208 and the facts of
that case help explain why states would embrace having this alternative path
to legal marriage. In Fenton v. Reed,209 Mrs. William Reed claimed a
widow’s pension from a local provident society after the 1806 death of her
husband.210 The society refused, however, on the basis that her marriage to
William was invalid.211 After all, William was not her first husband.212
Instead, she had previously wed a man named John Guest, who left her in
1785 and traveled to “foreign parts.”213 When he did not return, she married
Reed in 1792, believing her first husband to be dead.214 Guest was not dead,
however, and returned to New York later that year, where he lived until his
death in 1800.215

204. Rhodes, supra note 26, at 437.
205. See Peter Nicolas, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV. 931, 934
(2011) (“When entered into, a common law marriage provides the same rights, privileges, and
responsibilities as a ceremonial marriage, and is as durable as a ceremonial marriage, requiring
divorce proceedings to terminate the relationship.”).
206. Barron v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 984, 985–86 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
207. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 202 (2d ed. 1985)
(“Probably there was no such institution [as common-law marriage] in England.”); Adair
Dyer, The Internationalization of Family Law, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 626 (1997) (noting
that “the informal contractual status known as ‘common law marriage’ may have been an
American innovation”).
208. See Charles P. Kindregan Jr., Same-Sex Marriage: The Cultural Wars and the Lessons
of Legal History, 38 FAM. L.Q. 427, 434 n.45 (2004) (“Informal marriage appears to have first
been recognized by the New York court in Fenton v. Reed.”).
209. 4 Johns. 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (per curiam).
210. Id. at 52–53.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 52.
214. Id. (“[I]t was reported, and generally believed, that [Guest] had died in foreign parts.”).
215. Id.
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During this time, Guest “did not object to the connection between the
plaintiff and Reed, and said that he had no claim upon her, and never
interfered to disturb the harmony between them.”216 Nonetheless, given that
she never divorced her first husband and he was still living when she married
Reed, the society argued that her second marriage was void.217 Had she
attempted to marry Reed again following Guest’s death, the marriage would
have been valid, but she did not resolemnize her relationship with Reed.218
The court, however, held that it was not necessary to prove that the marriage
had been solemnized, holding instead that “[a] marriage may be proved . . .
from cohabitation, reputation, acknowledgment of the parties, reception in
the family, and other circumstances from which a marriage may be
inferred.”219 Turning to the facts of the case, the court found that
circumstances were such that, although her attempt to formally marry Reed
was invalid given her existing marriage to Guest, she subsequently
effectuated a common-law marriage with Reed after her first husband died:
“The parties cohabited together as husband and wife, and under the
reputation and understanding that they were such, from 1800 [when Guest
died] to 1806, when Reed died.”220
Other states would soon embrace the doctrine and its ability to protect the
interests of those in economically dependent relationships.221 By the end of
the nineteenth century, common-law marriage would become the law in a
majority of the states.222 It proved popular for a number of reasons, including
how well suited it was to frontier conditions where finding someone to
perform a formal wedding might be difficult,223 how it provided individuals
with greater autonomy and freedom from the state,224 how it helped
legitimize children,225 and how it provided for unsuspecting women who
216. Id.
217. Id. at 53. In part, the court agreed: “The marriage of the plaintiff below with William
Reed during the life-time of her husband John Guest, was null and void.” Id.
218. Id. at 52 (“[N]o solemnization of marriage was proved to have taken place between
the plaintiff and Reed, subsequent to the death of Guest.”).
219. Id. at 54 (“No formal solemnization of marriage was requisite. A contract of marriage
made per verba de presenti amounts to an actual marriage.”).
220. Id.
221. See Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes:
A Story of Compromise and
Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
45, 65–66 (1981) (“The idea that marriage could be validated by the mere consent of the
spouses gained strength from cases that . . . recognized informal or ‘common law’ marriages
and appeared in community property as well as in common law states.”).
222. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 715 (1996) (noting that the doctrine was recognized by “a
majority of the states in 1920 and even more in the nineteenth century”).
223. See Perry Dane, A Holy Secular Institution, 58 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1147 (2009)
(identifying “the difficulty of requiring resort to either a governmental or religious official in
a dispersed frontier society” as one of the reasons states embraced common-law marriage).
224. See Nicolas, supra note 205, at 939 (“One oft-cited rationale [for common-law
marriage] is a libertarian concept of autonomy and independence, the idea that marriage is a
natural right and that individuals should be free to enter into marriages without the need to
invoke the power of the state.”).
225. See Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal
Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2166 (2014) (“Judges and
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relied to their detriment on the existence of a valid marriage.226 In 1877, the
Supreme Court seemingly gave its blessing to the idea of marriage by
informal means when it held that, unless a state explicitly required formal
marriage, marriage laws that required a license and a ceremony were “merely
directory.”227
As the United States entered into the twentieth century, however,
common-law marriage began to lose favor rather rapidly.228 The various
reasons for that decline have been well-documented elsewhere and thus do
not require expansive discussion here, but in the words of Professor Cynthia
Grant Bowman, they essentially boil down to “urbanization,
industrialization, concerns about fraud, the ideology of the family, racism,
and eugenics.”229 Currently, only eight states and the District of Columbia
allow their citizens to effectuate marriage through informal means.230 Even
those states, however, have heightened proof requirements to establish a
common-law marriage,231 the most central being that the two parties show
“an express mutual agreement, which must be in words of the present
tense.”232 Recognizing that, in the absence of a formal ceremony, it might
be difficult to prove the existence of such an agreement, many states permit
parties to prove the agreement by relying on evidence of cohabitation and
having a reputation in the community as being married.233 Other states
lawyers acknowledged that a primary purpose of common law marriage was to ensure that
children born of such a union were legitimate.”).
226. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 957, 964 (2000) (“As common law marriage triumphed as a dominant legal
rule over the course of the nineteenth century, it took as its premise that the law should protect
innocent women from the whims and contrivances of irresponsible or rakish men.”).
227. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 79 (1877).
228. See Ashley Hedgecock, Untying the Knot: The Propriety of South Carolina’s
Recognition of Common Law Marriage, 58 S.C. L. REV. 555, 562 (2007) (“Beginning in the
late nineteenth century, many jurisdictions that previously recognized common law marriage
began to abolish the doctrine.”).
229. Grant Bowman, supra note 222, at 732.
230. See Common Law Marriage by State, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 11,
2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/common-law-marriage.aspx [https://
perma.cc/LH8B-UBPW] (listing states); Common Law Marriage Is Alive and Well in the
District of Columbia, JOSEPH, GREENWALD & LAAKE, PA (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.jgllaw.com/blog/common-law-marriage-alive-well-district-columbia
[https://perma.cc/ZA6R-96AT]. However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina recently
ruled that, going forward, it will no longer allow its citizens to enter into common-law
marriages, although it will continue to honor those that couples effectuated in the past. See
generally Stone v. Thompson, 833 S.E.2d 266 (S.C. 2019).
231. See Michael J. Higdon, Fatherhood by Conscription: Nonconsensual Insemination
and the Duty of Child Support, 46 GA. L. REV. 407, 453 (2012) (“[C]ourts in those states
recognizing common law marriage have noted that such claims are a ‘fruitful source of perjury
and fraud’ and, as such, have placed a heavy burden on the party claiming common law
marriage.” (quoting Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Pa. 1998))).
232. Cerovic v. Stojkov, 134 A.3d 766, 777 (D.C. 2016).
233. See Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a
Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1842–43 (1987) (“Although the doctrine of common
law marriage purportedly depends on the existence of an agreement to be married, normally
an agreement is inferred by courts when a couple engages in cohabitation and acquires a
reputation as husband and wife.”).
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explicitly require the parties to prove cohabitation and reputation along with
the existence of the agreement to enter into a common-law marriage.234
States also require that the parties had the capacity to wed one another.235
Although most states do not permit people within the state to effectuate a
common-law marriage, under full faith and credit, all states recognize a
common-law marriage validly effectuated in a state that does permit such
unions.236 States do so pursuant to the lex loci rule by which “courts ‘will
give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not
as a matter of obligation but out of deference and respect.’”237 Thus, even
states that do not permit common-law marriage can nonetheless use the
doctrine to extend family law protections to citizens who spent time in a state
that does permit informal marriage. Many states have done just that, often
by liberally construing the common-law marriage requirements of a sister
state.238 In reviewing such cases, it is clear that courts do so to protect
economically dependent “spouses” from the harms that would result from a
finding that there was never a valid marriage.
The classic example is Renshaw v. Heckler,239 a 1986 case out of the
Second Circuit. There, Edith Renshaw claimed to be the common-law wife
of Albert Renshaw for purposes of securing Social Security benefits
following Albert’s death.240 The couple was never formally married but had
been living as though they were for over twenty years.241 They exchanged
rings, celebrated their anniversary every year, and represented themselves as

234. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21,
74 n.132 (1994) (“Most jurisdictions also require cohabitation, or actually and openly living
together as husband and wife . . . . Some jurisdictions further require that the parties hold
themselves out to the world as husband and wife, and acquire a reputation as a married
couple.” (alteration in original) (quoting Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family?:
Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Nontraditional Family, 24 IDAHO L.
REV. 353, 361 (1987))).
235. See Strasser, supra note 26, at 414 (“A couple barred by law from celebrating a
ceremonial marriage will also be barred from contracting a common law marriage.”). In terms
of how that term is defined, Peter Nicolas explains that capacity “is interpreted to refer to
minimum age and mental capacity” but also “encompasses any potential legal impediment to
marrying, such as whether the parties are already married to other people, whether the
marriage would be incestuous, or whether the parties to the relationship are of the same sex.”
Nicolas, supra note 26, at 418 n.136.
236. See Lisa Milot, Restitching the American Marital Quilt: Untangling Marriage from
the Nuclear Family, 87 VA. L. REV. 701, 707–08 (2001) (“[B]ecause of the full faith and credit
afforded a valid marriage in one state by other states, though, all states recognize the legal
legitimacy of a common-law marriage contracted in another jurisdiction.”).
237. Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 975 (Md. 2012) (quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary
Comm’n v. CAE-Link Corp., 622 A.2d 745, 757 (Md. 1993)).
238. See Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 735, 759 (2011) (“[C]ourts in states that do not recognize common law marriage
sometimes stretch doctrine to recognize common law marriages of couples who reside
there.”).
239. 787 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986).
240. Id. at 51.
241. Id.
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married to those around them.242 The two even had a child together.243 The
problem, however, was that they resided in New York, which no longer
permitted common-law marriage.244
Nonetheless, the court found that the two had effectuated a common-law
marriage.245 It did so by relying on the fact that, for seven years in a row,
the two took an annual road trip to Virginia and North Carolina246—two
states that likewise do not permit common-law marriage. Pennsylvania,
however, did allow informal marriage and that fact proved relevant because
the couple spent a single night in Pennsylvania during each of these trips.247
Like other common-law states, Pennsylvania looked to cohabitation and
reputation when determining whether a couple had effectuated a commonlaw marriage.248 The Renshaws had clearly satisfied those elements over the
course of their long-term relationship, but the question was whether they had
done so while in Pennsylvania.249 Despite noting that Pennsylvania places a
“heavy burden”250 on those seeking to establish a common-law marriage, the
court nonetheless found that Edith had met that standard:
The Renshaws’ stays in Pennsylvania were admittedly short; but they
cohabitated during the entire time that they were there. While the evidence
of reputation is not extensive, they held themselves out as husband and wife
to every individual they knew that they saw in Pennsylvania—his mother,
her brother, and their daughter. Moreover, Mrs. Renshaw testified that
when Mr. Renshaw made reservations over the phone, he indicated on at
least one occasion that the reservations were for himself, his wife, and their
daughter.251

Although the court stated that, “[i]n different circumstances, such facts alone
might not prove sufficient,”252 it nonetheless held that “the Renshaws’
conduct while in Pennsylvania and elsewhere is . . . sufficient to . . . conclude

242. Id. Additionally, she took his last name and “the couple filed joint tax returns as
husband and wife, and Mr. Renshaw listed Mrs. Renshaw as his wife and beneficiary on his
life insurance policy.” Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 52.
245. Id. at 53–54.
246. Id. at 51–52.
247. Id. at 52.
248. Id. (“Generally, a common-law marriage may be created by uttering words in the
present tense with the intent to establish a marital relationship; but where no such utterance is
proved, Pennsylvania law also permits a finding of marriage based on reputation and
cohabitation when established by satisfactory proof.” (citation omitted) (first citing
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 398 A.2d 978, 980 (Pa. 1979); and then citing In re Estate of
Wagner, 159 A.2d 495, 498 (Pa. 1960))).
249. Id. It was on this basis that the lower court had ruled against Mrs. Renshaw finding
that “at best only 16 days out of Mr. Renshaw’s lifetime were spent in Pennsylvania [and] the
overwhelming bulk of the supporting evidence rests on actions taken outside of Pennsylvania
in non-common law states.” Id. at 53 (quoting Magistrate’s Decision & Order at 9, Renshaw,
787 F.2d 50 (No. 85-6272)).
250. Id. at 52.
251. Id. at 53.
252. Id.
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that the Renshaws entered into a valid common-law marriage under
Pennsylvania law.”253
Renshaw is but one example where a court has held that a valid commonlaw marriage arose after only a few days in a common-law marriage state.254
Although the reasoning in these cases appears to be a bit of a stretch,255 the
states are clearly motivated to protect the economic interests of vulnerable
citizens.256
B. Invalid Marriage
Whereas common-law marriage allows parties to effectuate a marriage
through informal means, other doctrines in the law allow a party to collect
marital benefits from a formal marriage that was nonetheless invalid.
Collectively, these doctrines are often referred to as the marriage validation
principle, which courts use to try and find a valid marriage even in the face
of facts that cast enormous doubt on that conclusion.257 The courts take this
approach in light of the harms that could befall an economically dependent
“spouse” who ultimately discovers that her marriage is invalid, thus
depriving her of the benefits and protections to which she thought she was
entitled.258 Two notable examples of ways in which courts attempt to
validate questionable marriages are the doctrines of marriage by estoppel and
putative marriage.
Marriage by estoppel prohibits a party from using an invalid divorce to
void a subsequent marriage. However, the doctrine “is unlike classic
equitable estoppel in that it does not focus solely on whether one party has
made a misrepresentation on which the other has reasonably relied.”259
Instead, “[t]he focus is broader and requires a consideration of all of the
circumstances surrounding not only the procurement of the divorce but also

253. Id. at 54.
254. See, e.g., Blaw-Knox Constr. Equip. Co. v. Morris, 596 A.2d 679, 687 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991) (holding that a Maryland couple effectuated a common-law marriage after
spending two nights at a Pennsylvania hotel to attend a funeral); In re Coney v. R.S.R. Corp.,
563 N.Y.S.2d 211, 212 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that a couple effectuated a common-law
marriage after spending three days visiting family in Georgia).
255. See Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 238, at 759 (noting that “courts in states that
do not recognize common law marriage sometimes stretch doctrine to recognize common law
marriages of couples who reside there”).
256. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form:
Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 453
(2013) (pointing out that, because “traditional common law marriage is not likely to make a
modern comeback . . . alternative constructs and regulations are used to protect vulnerable
parties in long-term cohabitant relationships”).
257. See ESTIN, supra note 133, at 98 (“[T]he marriage validation principle . . . seeks to
uphold marriages whenever possible.”).
258. See Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law
Institute’s “Domestic Partners” Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1198 (“The goal of
protecting the financial interests or financial equity of individuals who enter into such
relationships is similar to the policy underlying common law marriage, putative spouse, and
equitable doctrines.”).
259. Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
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the conduct of the parties thereafter and the effect of a declaration of the
invalidity of the divorce on others.”260 As such, “[i]t is sufficient, in many
cases, that a court find only that it would be unfair to let a party take
advantage of the legal invalidity of a divorce decree and the invalidity of the
subsequent marriage.”261
Consider the case of Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss,262 where Pennsylvania
resident Beverly Lowenschuss divorced her first husband in 1964 after
traveling to Alabama.263 However, because she failed to establish residency
in Alabama, her divorce was invalid.264 Not realizing her failure, Beverly
returned to Pennsylvania, where she met and married Fred Lowenschuss.265
The couple eventually had four children together.266 Although Fred testified
that he learned of Beverly’s defective divorce in 1974, he nonetheless
remained in the relationship as though nothing had changed.267 In 1981,
Beverly filed for divorce.268 In response, Fred argued that, because she had
never legally divorced her first husband, he and Beverly were never legally
married.269 The court, however, held that Fred was estopped from raising
the circumstances of Beverly’s previous divorce.270
Even though Fred was not a party to her prior divorce proceedings, the
court ruled that, in light of his conduct, it would be inequitable for him to
raise that defense at such a late date.271 “[B]oth parties relied in good faith
on the Alabama divorce in marrying each other in 1965 and continued to rely
on that divorce at minimum until 1974. . . . Husband conducted himself as a
married man for nine years before 1974 and after 1974 he continued to live
as he had before.”272 Ultimately, the court found that
[n]o social purpose will be served by a decision that this marriage simply
does not exist and that wife is still the legal wife of her first husband and
that her four children were born of an illicit relationship. To hold that

260. Id.
261. JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 42–43 (4th ed. 2013).
262. 579 A.2d 377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
263. Id. at 378. Around this time, Alabama was a popular destination for those seeking a
relatively easy and quick divorce. See Migratory Divorce: The Alabama Experience, 75
HARV. L. REV. 568, 569 (1962).
264. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d at 378 (“Wife spent at most two days in Alabama and does
not dispute the fact that she has never been a bona fide resident of Alabama.”).
265. Id. Fred was an attorney and he “knew that wife was divorced, but denies knowing
any of the details concerning how the divorce was procured.” Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. He learned of the divorce that year after he commenced a divorce action, which
he subsequently withdrew. Id.
268. Id. at 377.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 386.
271. Id. (“Such a decision would contravene the strongly entrenched policy of this
Commonwealth favoring preservation of the family unit.”).
272. Id. at 385.
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husband may now raise this challenge simply in order to avoid the financial
obligations of his marriage would be grossly inequitable.273

To justify its ruling, the court reiterated the important and protective
functions of both marriage and divorce, writing that “a decision which would
allow husband to avoid his marital obligations at this late juncture would be
completely inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s contemporary attitude
toward divorce, which is grounded in the application of equitable principles
to achieve economic justice and overall fairness between the parties.”274 As
the court’s opinion makes clear, Fred was estopped largely because he
continued in the marriage long after he learned of the faulty divorce. Had he
sought to invalidate the marriage shortly after learning the truth, he would
have had a stronger argument. However, Beverly might have still had some
recourse as a putative spouse.
Putative marriage is another marriage validation principle, and it allows
courts to extend the civil effects of marriage to one who in good faith entered
into a marriage that was nonetheless invalid.275 In other words, “[a] putative
marriage . . . is a marriage which is in reality null, but which allows the civil
effects of a valid marriage to flow to the party or parties who contracted it in
good faith.”276 The only requirements parties must meet to avail themselves
of this protection are to have had a ceremonial marriage and to have entered
it with a good faith belief that the marriage was valid277—good faith being
defined as “an honest and reasonable belief that there exists no legal
impediment to the marriage.”278
Although putative marriage does not equal legal marriage,279 the doctrine
is nonetheless intended to promote equity and to protect innocent spouses—
for example, individuals who innocently but erroneously believed that they
had obtained a valid divorce prior to remarrying. As one court explained,
“[a] marriage contracted when one spouse is a party to a previously
273. Id. at 386 (“Therefore, we hold that principles of estoppel based on well-established
social policies favoring preservation of the family and economic justice require us to estop
husband from asserting the invalidity of wife’s Alabama divorce.”).
274. Id.
275. See Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1, 6
(1985).
276. Id.
277. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revision of the Law of Marriage: One Baby Step Forward,
48 LA. L. REV. 1131, 1150 (1988) (“A prerequisite to the application of the putative marriage
doctrine is contracting the marriage in good faith. The word contracting suggests a ceremony,
which would mean that a marriage that is absolutely null because of no ceremony would never
produce civil effects.”).
278. Casey E. Faucon, “Living Separate and Apart”: Solving the Problem of Putative
Community Property in Louisiana, 85 TUL. L. REV. 771, 774 n.11 (2011); see also Succession
of Marinoni, 164 So. 797, 804 (La. 1935) (defining good faith as “ignoran[ce] of the cause
which prevents the formation of the marriage or the defects in its celebration which caused its
nullity” (emphases omitted)).
279. See Lee v. Hunt, 431 F. Supp. 371, 376 (W.D. La. 1977) (“[A] ‘putative spouse’ is not
a spouse and has no personal status. Instead, a ‘putative marriage’ merely creates the
responsibilities that one spouse owes the other because one spouse is guilty of a fault and the
other innocently believes the marriage is genuine.”).
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undissolved marriage is absolutely null; however, equity demands that
innocent persons not be injured through an innocent relationship.”280 As
Professor Christopher Blakesley points out, the primary motivation behind
this doctrine is the desire to ensure fairness: “The putative marriage doctrine
is a device developed to ameliorate or correct the injustice which would occur
if civil effects were not allowed to flow to a party to a null marriage who
believes in good faith that he or she is validly married.”281
To illustrate, consider the 2004 Nevada case of Williams v. Williams.282
There, Richard and Marcie Williams were married in 1973 and lived together
as husband and wife for the next twenty-seven years, at which time Richard
learned that Marcie had never divorced her first husband.283 As a result,
Richard filed an annulment action to have his marriage to Marcie declared
void.284 The Supreme Court of Nevada used this opportunity to adopt the
putative spouse doctrine to ensure “[f]airness and equity.”285 The court ruled
that a putative marriage existed despite Richard’s argument that Marcie had
not entered into their marriage in good faith.286 Specifically, Marcie testified
“that in 1971, she ran into [her first husband] at a Reno bus station, where he
specifically told her that they were divorced and he was living with another
woman.”287 Richard argued that such reliance was unreasonable given that
she had never been served with divorce papers and, at the very least, she had
had a duty to inquire further into the existence of the divorce before marrying
again.288 The court, however, rejected Richard’s arguments and held that
“[t]he record reflects no reason for Marcie to have disbelieved him and, thus,
no reason to have investigated the truth of his representations.”289
In ruling as it did, the court took extensive note of Marcie’s financial
circumstances:
During the 27 years that the parties believed themselves to be married,
Marcie was a homemaker and a mother. From 1981 to 1999, Marcie was a
licensed child-care provider for six children. During that time, she earned
$460 a week. At trial, Marcie had a certificate of General Educational
Development (G.E.D.) and earned $8.50 an hour at a retirement home. She
was 63 years old and lived with her daughter because she could not afford
to live on her own.290

280. Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826, 842 (W.D. La. 1978), aff’d 631 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.
1980).
281. Blakesley, supra note 275, at 6.
282. 97 P.3d 1124 (Nev. 2004) (per curiam).
283. Id. at 1126.
284. Id. (“Marcie answered and counterclaimed for one-half of the property and spousal
support as a putative spouse.”).
285. Id. at 1128.
286. Id. at 1127–29.
287. Id. at 1127 (“According to Marcie, she discovered she was still married to [her first
husband] during the course of the annulment proceedings with Richard.”).
288. Id. at 1129.
289. Id. Relatedly, the court also ruled that “[g]ood faith is presumed. The party asserting
lack of good faith has the burden of proving bad faith.” Id. at 1128.
290. Id. at 1127.
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Implicit in this recitation is the court’s awareness of the degree to which
Marcie would be harmed if forced to walk away from a twenty-seven-year
relationship, which she believed was a marriage, with no rights to the
“marital” property. By finding that Marcie was—if not a legal spouse—a
putative spouse, the property acquired during her marriage to Richard was
labeled quasi-community property and divided equally between them.291
C. No Marriage
Some states have even used their equitable powers to award marital
benefits to individuals who never married but merely cohabitated in a
domestic relationship. Historically, the states did very little to protect the
economic interests of those who enter into such relationships.292 And they
did so purposefully, reasoning that any benefits afforded cohabitating
couples might discourage formal marriage.293 With its landmark decision in
Marvin v. Marvin,294 however, California began to change all that, holding
that express contracts between cohabitants regarding property distribution
were enforceable so long as they were not conditioned “upon the immoral
and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services.”295 In the absence
of an express agreement, the Supreme Court of California held that recovery
was likewise permitted on the basis of an implied contract “or equitable
remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts.”296
By opening the door to legal protections for cohabitants, Marvin was
heavily criticized by those who feared that such an approach would “weaken
marriage as the foundation of our family-based society.”297 However, in the
more than forty years that have elapsed since Marvin, most agree that overall
it had little impact.298 First, a handful of states continue in their refusal to
enforce any cohabitation agreements.299 Second, even among those that do,

291. Id. at 1129–30.
292. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex
Couples, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 159 (2005) (“[H]istorically, the cohabiting relationship was
treated as a ‘negative status’ in the law. That is, unmarried cohabitants experienced significant
legal burdens by virtue of their relationship alone.”).
293. See Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77
U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 722 (2006) (noting the concern that providing “legal equivalence
between marriage and cohabitation will devalue and discourage marriage”).
294. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
295. Id. at 112.
296. Id. at 110.
297. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979). The court held that cohabitation
agreements “are unenforceable for the reason that they contravene the public policy [of the
state] . . . disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly
unmarried cohabitants.” Id. at 1211.
298. As Professor Deborah Rhode has pointed out, “[w]hat little empirical evidence is
available suggests that cohabitation generally is not the result of a conscious choice. Rather,
individuals tend to drift into such relationships without focusing on the future or its legal
implications.” DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW
138 (1989).
299. Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in Shaping Family
Formations and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1039 (2015) (“[E]ven today, Illinois,

2021]

(IN)FORMAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY

1387

Marvin and its progeny only offer limited protections. Specifically, state law
protections for cohabitants typically require that the parties entered into an
agreement regarding their respective rights.300 While some states permit
implied agreements, others require that they be express.301 Some states even
insist that the agreements be in writing.302 Regardless, by conditioning legal
protection on the existence of a contract, relatively few cohabitants are likely
to benefit given that, as one commentator aptly notes, “[i]f couples do not in
fact think of their relationship in contract terms, then a doctrine that directs
courts to decide their disputes by looking for a contract is unlikely to find
one.”303
Nonetheless, two states that do offer protections for cohabitants whose
relationship has ended analogize to the states’ divorce laws. For example,
the Supreme Court of Nevada has held that property that cohabitants agreed
to hold “as if they were married” is subject to the state’s community property
laws.304 In so ruling, the court emphasized that it “by no means seeks to
encourage, nor does this opinion suggest, that couples should avoid
marriage.”305 Instead, the court “reaffirm[ed] this state’s strong public policy
interest in encouraging legally consummated marriages.”306 Nonetheless,
the court pointed out that “this policy is not furthered by allowing one
participant . . . to abscond with the bulk of the couple’s acquisitions.”307
Washington has gone one step further and eschews the contract approach
altogether, focusing instead on the existence of “a stable, marital-like
relationship.”308 For cohabitants who establish the existence of such a
relationship (sometimes referred to as the “meretricious relationship test”309),
the Supreme Court of Washington has held that “income and property
acquired during [the relationship] should be characterized in a similar manner

Georgia, and Louisiana still do not recognize cohabitation contracts between either oppositesex or same-sex couples.”).
300. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 262 (describing the “contract-based” approach as
the “default framework”).
301. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (N.Y. 1980) (“The notion of an
implied contract between an unmarried couple living together is, thus, contrary to both New
York decisional law and the implication arising from our Legislature’s abolition of commonlaw marriage.”).
302. See Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 832 n.103
(2008) (“At least three states require a written contract when the consideration is nonmarital
conjugal cohabitation.”).
303. Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2001).
304. W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Nev. 1992).
305. Id. at 1223.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1223–24.
308. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (“A meretricious
relationship is a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge
that a lawful marriage between them does not exist.”).
309. See generally Gavin M. Parr, What Is a “Meretricious Relationship”?: An Analysis
of Cohabitant Property Rights Under Connell v. Francisco, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1243 (1999).
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as income and property acquired during marriage.”310 Washington courts
have even applied this approach to same-sex cohabitants, giving them
marriage-like remedies years before the state would permit same-sex
marriage. Consider, for instance, a 2004 case in which Lynn Gormley and
Julia Robertson were involved in a ten-year relationship.311 After examining
the nature of the couple’s relationship, the court ruled that they were entitled
to an equitable division of property.312
In so ruling, the court rejected the argument that, because the two women
could not legally marry, their relationship could not be construed as quasimarital: “[I]t is of no consequence to the cohabitating couple, same-sex or
otherwise, whether they can legally marry. Indeed, one of the key elements
of a meretricious relationship is knowledge by the partners that a lawful
marriage between them does not exist.”313 While agreeing that “[w]hether
same-sex couples can legally marry is for the legislature to decide,” the court
concluded that the duty to “‘examine the [meretricious] relationship and the
property accumulations and make a just and equitable disposition of the
property’ is a judicial, not a legislative, extension of the rights and protections
of marriage to intimate, unmarried cohabitants.”314
D. Informal Adoption
States have not only relied on informal acts to award marital benefits; they
also permit informal acts to justify recognition of certain parent-child
relationships. One such example is the doctrine of equitable adoption, also
referred to as virtual adoption, de facto adoption, and adoption by
estoppel.315 Equitable adoption is designed to protect an individual who
mistakenly believes themselves to be the legal child (whether biological or
through adoption) of another.316 The doctrine, which has been recognized in
a majority of the states,317 typically arises in the context of parental
disinheritance, but courts have also relied on the doctrine in other areas as

310. Connell, 898 P.2d at 836.
311. Gormley v. Robertson, 83 P.3d 1042, 1043 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
312. Id. at 1046–47. “They pooled their resources and acquired property as well as debt.
They had a joint banking account that was used to pay all monthly obligations, whether
preexisting or incurred separately or jointly.” Id. at 1044.
313. Id. at 1045.
314. Id. at 1046 (quoting In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) (en
banc)).
315. See Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The
Cultural Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225
(2008).
316. See Lindsay Ayn Warner, Bending the Bow of Equity: Three Ways Florida Can
Improve Its Equitable Adoption Policy, 38 STETSON L. REV. 577, 585 (2009) (explaining that
equitable adoption protects the interests of children who, though blameless, were never legally
adopted by their adoptive parents).
317. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the Implications
for Inheritance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006) (“Since at least twenty-eight states do recognize
equitable adoption, the doctrine remains a theoretical option in a majority of states.”).
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well, including divorce proceedings318 and claims of parental rights.319
Historically, equitable adoption has been “predicated upon principles of
contract law and equitable enforcement of [an] agreement to adopt.”320 Thus,
courts have typically required the existence of an adoption contract before
permitting a party to pursue a claim for equitable adoption.321
Requiring the existence of a contract, however, can work great injustice.
The case of O’Neal v. Wilkes322 provides an excellent example. There, Hattie
O’Neal was a child born in 1949 to an unwed mother who died when Hattie
was only eight years old.323 After living with her paternal aunt for some
time, Hattie was placed with a married couple, Mr. and Mrs. Roswell Cook,
who were looking to adopt a little girl.324 Although the Cooks never formally
adopted Hattie, from the time she went home with the Cooks until she
married in 1975, she was in all meaningful ways their daughter.325 After
Hattie left their home and got married, she continued her relationship with
the Cooks, who referred to Hattie’s children as their grandchildren.326 When
Mr. Cook died without a will, Hattie brought suit, claiming that Cook had
adopted her by way of a virtual adoption and, as such, she was entitled to
inherit from him.327 The Supreme Court of Georgia refused Hattie’s claim
for the sole reason that her aunt did not have the legal authority to enter into
an adoption contract with the Cooks.328
Recognizing the unfairness that can arise from such a rigid requirement, a
number of states have instead started to rely “on equitable principles of
fairness and intent rather than the ordinary rules of contract law.”329
Consider, for instance, the 2013 case of DeHart v. DeHart330 in which the
Supreme Court of Illinois was confronted with an individual who was
disinherited by the man he had always believed to be his father.331 The
318. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 109 (N.D. 2000) (“The substantive
circumstances of this case, a divorce in which child support was requested, are identical to the
other cases in which husbands have been held to have equitably adopted children for the
purposes of imposing child support.”).
319. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Boynes, 396 P.3d 774, 779 (Nev. 2017) (concluding “that the
district court did not err in granting [respondent] paternity through equitable adoption of the
child”).
320. Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 606 (N.C. 1997) (quoting 2 AM. JUR. 2d Adoption
§ 53 (1994)).
321. See Higdon, supra note 315, at 225 (“[T]he tests that courts have developed to
determine whether an equitable adoption exists almost invariably require that there first have
been a contract to adopt between the natural and ‘foster’ parents.”).
322. 439 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. 1994).
323. Id. at 491.
324. Id.
325. Id. (“Although O’Neal was never statutorily adopted by Cook, he raised her and
provided for her education and she resided with him until her marriage in 1975.”).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 492 (“Because O’Neal’s relatives did not have the legal authority to enter into a
contract for her adoption, their alleged ratification of the adoption contract was of no legal
effect.”).
329. DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85, 103 (Ill. 2013).
330. 986 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. 2013).
331. Id. at 90–91.
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plaintiff, James DeHart, was born in 1944.332 For almost sixty years, the
decedent, Donald DeHart, had represented himself to the community as
James’s biological father.333 In addition, Donald even provided James with
a birth certificate that seemingly confirmed his parentage.334 In 2000,
however, James obtained a certified copy of his birth certificate, and it made
clear that his father was someone other than Donald.335
Donald subsequently conceded that he was not James’s biological father
but that he had nonetheless adopted James in 1946.336 Consistent with that
representation, Donald continued to hold James out as his son.337 When
Donald subsequently died in 2007, however, his will included the statement,
“I have no children” and, indeed, it appeared that he had lied about having
adopted James.338 In the will, Donald left nothing to James and instead left
everything to a woman Donald had wed just two years prior to his death.339
James filed a challenge to the will, arguing in part that he had been equitably
adopted by Donald.340 Although Donald’s widow disputed the claim, the
court ruled in James’s favor, holding that, “where there is sufficient,
objective evidence of an intent to adopt (or fraudulently or mistakenly
holding out as a natural child on a continual basis), supported by a close
enduring familial relationship, . . . equitable adoption [will] be
recognized.”341
In so ruling, Illinois joined other states that have permitted equitable
adoption claims even in the absence of a formal adoption contract. West
Virginia was seemingly the first state to do so when its highest court stated
that, “[w]hile the existence of an express contract of adoption is very
convincing evidence, an implied contract of adoption is an unnecessary
fiction created by courts as a protection from fraudulent claims.”342
Accordingly, the court held that an equitable adoption could take place even
without a contract to adopt, so long as the proponent “can, by clear, cogent
and convincing evidence, prove sufficient facts to convince the trier of fact
that his status is identical to that of a formally adopted child, except only for
the absence of a formal order of adoption.”343 California followed a similar
approach in 2004 when its highest court held that one who claims to be an
equitably adopted child need only “demonstrate the existence of some direct
332. Id. at 90.
333. Id.
334. Id. (“Donald and plaintiff used the purported birth certificate, to conduct the affairs of
life (until the year 2000), using it to enroll plaintiff in grade school and high school and using
it to convey to those requesting proof of identity that plaintiff was Donald’s son.”).
335. Id.
336. Id. (“Donald also explained in no uncertain terms that he had hired a lawyer in
Homewood, Illinois, to handle the adoption so that ‘it was all legal.’”).
337. Id.
338. Id. (“There is no legal documentation of an adoption in the record.”).
339. Id. at 90–91.
340. Id. at 91.
341. Id. at 104.
342. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369, 374 (W. Va. 1978).
343. Id.
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expression, on the decedent’s part, of an intent to adopt the claimant.”344 The
court explained that such intent could be established by the existence of “an
unperformed express agreement or promise to adopt”345 but can also arise
from “an invalid or unconsummated attempt to adopt, the decedent’s
statement of his or her intent to adopt the child, or the decedent’s
representation to the claimant or to the community at large that the claimant
was the decedent’s natural or legally adopted child.”346
E. No Adoption and No Biological Link
Somewhat related to equitable adoption is the concept of an equitable
parent, which different courts have referred to as a quasi-parent, in loco
parentis, and a psychological parent.347 Essentially, an equitable parent is
one who gains some parental rights as a result of having acted as a parent to
a legally unrelated child,348 typically with the consent of the legal parent.349
In a growing number of cases, including Ramey v. Sutton,350 same-sex
partners have relied on claims of equitable parenthood to gain parental rights
over children with whom they lack a biological tie. After all, medical science
currently does not permit two people of the same gender to conceive,351
meaning that children of same-sex couples will only have, at most, a
biological connection with one member of the same-sex relationship.
Those in same-sex relationships, of course, are not the first to bring such
claims. Individuals who have acted as quasi-parents have a long history of
petitioning the courts for parental rights. Although they have not always been
successful, the point remains that this is yet one more area of family law
where the courts have been willing to bestow familial rights on those who
lack formal family relationships. Before looking at those cases, however, it
is important to understand that this is an area of the law that is rapidly
evolving, due in large part to the fact that family complexity has changed
drastically in the last few decades due to “higher rates of divorce, nonmarital
childbearing, cohabitation, and remarriage.”352 As a consequence of these
344. Bean v. Ford (Estate of Ford), 82 P.3d 747, 754 (Cal. 2004).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See Higdon, supra note 202, at 944.
348. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429,
458 (2007) (defining a quasi-parent as “a person not a legal parent who nonetheless has greater
rights in a contest with the legal parent than does any other third party”).
349. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 435 (Wis.
1995) (adopting a four-part test “[t]o demonstrate the existence of the petitioner’s parent-like
relationship with the child,” the first element of which is “that the biological or adoptive parent
consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like
relationship with the child”); see also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
350. 362 P.3d 217 (Okla. 2015); see also supra notes 142–51 and accompanying text.
351. As advances in assisted reproduction continue, even this may change. See Michael
Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1065, 1093 (discussing
technologies whereby sperm cells might be converted to egg cells and vice versa, permitting
same-sex couples to reproduce).
352. Ariel Kalil et al., Time Investments in Children Across Family Structures, 654 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 150, 150 (2014).
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new dynamics, children today are more likely to look to individuals as
parents who are, in reality, legal strangers.353 Thus, courts are being asked
to increasingly wrestle with the difficult question of, in the absence of a
biological or legal connection to the child, whether an individual can ever
become a parent. And, if so, how is a court to reconcile that recognition with
the parental rights of the child’s legal parents.
In several cases, including claims brought by cohabitants, courts have
seemed resistant to extend such recognition. For instance, Donald Merkel
cohabitated with his girlfriend, Tamera Cooper, and her son for seven
years.354 Despite being neither the child’s legal nor biological father, Donald
nonetheless assumed responsibility for helping raise the boy.355 When the
relationship between the two adults ended, the Supreme Court of South
Dakota refused to recognize him as an equitable parent: “Before a parent’s
right to custody over his or her own children will be disturbed in favor of a
nonparent a clear showing against the parent of ‘gross misconduct or
unfitness, or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the
child’ is required.”356 Stepparents have faced similar difficulties. For
example, in a 2009 case out of Illinois, Nicholas Gansner and Miki Mancine
were married a few months after Miki adopted a son, William.357 Nicholas
never adopted William but nonetheless held himself out as William’s father
and served as the child’s primary caregiver.358 When Miki filed for divorce,
Nicholas petitioned for sole custody.359 The court, however, rejected his
claim, noting that the state had not recognized equitable parentage and that
Nicholas, despite knowing “at all times that he would have to formally adopt
William in order to be his legal parent,” failed to do so.360
Other courts have been more sympathetic to such claims. For instance, in
1992, a Minnesota court granted visitation to a stepfather, David Simmons,
over the objections of the child’s mother, JoEllen Vasicheck.361 The couple
had married in 1989.362 At the time, JoEllen had a five-year-old son from a
previous relationship.363 When the couple separated eighteen months later,
David petitioned the court for visitation.364 While acknowledging that “the
353. The term “legal stranger” is often used as a synonym for “nonparent.” See generally
John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351 (1998) (using “nonparent” and “legal stranger” interchangeably);
see also David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles of
Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1075, 1087 (noting that “long-time caregivers lacking
biological or adoptive ties are classified as nonparents, or legal ‘strangers’”).
354. Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253, 254 (S.D. 1991).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 255 (quoting Langerman v. Langerman, 336 N.W.2d 669, 670 (S.D. 1983)).
357. In re Marriage of Mancine, 9 N.E.3d 550, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
358. Id. at 556.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 568.
361. Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
362. Id. at 789.
363. Id. (“[The] biological father has had no contact with him and has surrendered his
parental rights.”).
364. Id. at 790.
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question of whether a former stepparent may assert a common-law right to
visitation is one of first impression,” the trial court ruled in his favor.365
Specifically, the court held that “a former stepparent who was in loco parentis
with the former stepchild may be entitled to visitation under the common
law.”366 Finding nothing in the record to contradict the trial court’s
determination that visitation with David would be in the child’s best interest,
the appellate court affirmed.367 A number of courts have offered similar
relief to those who fail to qualify as legal parents.368
Included within those cases are instances where courts have used equitable
parentage to bestow parental rights on those in same-sex relationships. For
instance, a North Carolina court, applying the best interest of the child
standard, awarded joint legal and physical custody of a child to the mother,
Irene Dwinnell, and the mother’s former partner, Joellen Mason.369
Although the mother argued that the ruling would infringe her constitutional
rights to direct the upbringing of her child, the court announced that “[w]hen
a legal parent invites a third party into a child’s life, and that invitation alters
a child’s life by essentially providing him with another parent, the legal
parent’s rights to unilaterally sever that relationship are necessarily
reduced.”370 In so ruling, the court noted that the two women “lived together
as a family and Dwinnell led her child to believe that Mason was one of his
parents.”371
These cases illustrate but a few examples of the evolving family forms that
have led to increasing numbers of children being reared (sometimes
exclusively) by those who fail to qualify as a formal legal parent. These cases
likewise reveal the degree to which the protections afforded to equitable
parents vary by state. In light of the harms that can befall children when
those they see as parents are not treated as such by the law, a number of
scholars have argued that state law needs to be more consistent when it comes
to recognizing equitable parenthood and in providing equitable parents with
legal parental rights.372 The same is true regarding backdating claims by
those who are unable to count the pre-equality portion of a same-sex
relationship toward a formal marriage given the unconstitutional laws
prohibiting such unions. Just as the states have found ways to award family365. Id.
366. Id. at 791. According to the court, “[b]ecause [the statute] does not contain any clause
specifically repealing, restricting, or abridging a non-parent’s common-law visitation rights,
we construe the statute to extend and supplement the common-law rule.” Id.
367. Id. at 792.
368. At least one court has relied on equitable adoption to extend parental rights to a samesex spouse. See Stankevich v. Milliron, 882 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (ruling
that a same-sex spouse could qualify as an “equitable parent” to the biological child of the
other spouse when that child was born during the marriage).
369. Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 60 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
370. Id. at 69 (quoting Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 169 (S.C. 2006)).
371. Id. at 68.
372. See Higdon, supra note 202, at 956 (“Although state variation is not an inherently bad
thing, discrimination on the basis of family structure and the harm such discrimination plays
in the lives of children is something the law should not tolerate.”).
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like benefits to other relationships that fail to meet the formal requirements
of family law, so too must they find ways to extend marital benefits to those
who were in relationships that would have been marital had that been a legal
option. Although the states need not do so in the same precise way, it is the
position of this Article that Obergefell demands some form of equitable
remedy—one that currently does not exist in the law but for which the above
equitable remedies are highly instructive.
IV. EQUITABLE MARRIAGE
As detailed above, courts already use a number of equitable doctrines that
enable them to extend family law protections to those who have spent time
in informal family-like relationships.373 Each doctrine owes its existence to
the courts’ desire to protect vulnerable citizens from the harms that can arise
from misplaced reliance on the existence of a formal domestic relationship.
Consider, for instance, someone who spends twenty years in a relationship
that she believes to be a marriage. Imagine that she does not work outside
the home and all valuable property is in her spouse’s name. If it were
somehow revealed that the marriage was invalid, she would—absent some
other remedy—be left with very little financially to show for those twenty
years and have limited ability to now rebuild her life. It is primarily within
this space that these equitable doctrines operate.374 There is, however,
another concern at play—the goal of fulfilling party expectations.375 As
many courts have referenced when applying them, these doctrines concern
individuals who entered into relationships in good faith, assuming that they
would be protected or, at the very least, that they were not jeopardizing their
economic self-interests in the process.
Those concerns apply with equal force in the context of those who spent
time in same-sex relationships that would have been marriages but for the
unconstitutional laws preventing such unions. In truth, these individuals are
even more entitled to some sort of protection given the constitutional right at
play. As a number of scholars have made clear, a retroactive application of
Obergefell is not merely good policy, it is constitutionally required. For
instance, Professor Lee-ford Tritt has concluded that “Obergefell should be
373. See supra Part III.
374. See supra notes 281, 307 and accompanying text.
375. See, e.g., Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 216 (Cal. 2013) (“Our court
made clear from the beginning that the fundamental purpose of the putative spouse doctrine
was to protect the expectations of innocent parties and to achieve results that are equitable,
fair, and just.”); W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Nev. 1992) (“[T]his
court must protect the reasonable expectations of unmarried cohabitants with respect to
transactions concerning their property rights.”); Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family?:
Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Nontraditional Family, 24 IDAHO L.
REV. 353, 371 (1987) (“[C]ourts have developed the doctrines of ‘equitable adoption’ and
‘adoption by estoppel’ to protect the child’s justifiable expectations.”); Kathryn S. Vaughn,
Comment, The Recent Changes to the Texas Informal Marriage Statute: Limitation or
Abolition of Common-Law Marriage?, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 1131, 1140 (1991) (“The first, and
probably most important, function of common-law marriage is protecting the good faith
expectations of the parties.”).
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applied purely retroactively as to both choice-of-law matters and remedial
considerations” so as to “rectif[y] the property deprivations of
unconstitutional unrecognized marriages.”376 Similarly, Professor Nicolas
explains that “backdating provides same-sex couples with the ‘make whole’
relief they are entitled to for past violations of their constitutional right to
marry.”377 Such sentiments are consistent with what the Supreme Court
itself has said regarding remedial decrees: “[they] must be designed as nearly
as possible ‘to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.’”378
Thus, if individuals are to be provided with true marriage equality, some
retroactivity is required. Unfortunately, none of the existing doctrines is
currently suited to address this particular situation. As a result, these
individuals require a new form of protection given that their relationships
either ended before marriage equality became the law of the land or their
eventual marriages fail to capture the true length of the relationship, on which
a number of marital benefits are conditioned.379 The remainder of this part
explores why, despite being inapposite in this context, the existing doctrines
are nonetheless instructive when it comes to crafting a new equitable
doctrine—referred to here as equitable marriage—that would offer the
necessary protections. With that in mind, this part then puts forth concrete
suggestions on how equitable marriage should be applied and how courts
should deal with the potential criticisms and complications that could arise.
A. Filling the Equitable Void
To deal with same-sex relationships that predated marriage equality, one
might ask why not simply bring back some form of common-law marriage?
It is, after all, the only equitable doctrine of the five discussed that gives
formal recognition, with all the attendant rights and obligations, to an
informally created relationship.380 In contrast, the others merely provide for
limited rights and remedies. Additionally, there is some precedent for using
common-law marriage in this context. After Loving, courts took this
approach to retroactively extend marriage equality to interracial relationships
that were either already in existence381 or had ended before Loving.382
Further, as discussed earlier, a few states have already relied on common-law
marriage to retroactively convert some same-sex relationships into
marriages.383
376. Tritt, supra note 26, at 945.
377. Nicolas, supra note 26, at 441.
378. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 746 (1974)).
379. See supra Part II.A.
380. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
381. See Nicolas, supra note 26, at 424–25.
382. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lewis, 306 F. Supp. 1177, 1183–84 (N.D. Ala.
1969) (recognizing a common-law marriage between an interracial couple even though the
husband died a few months before Loving was issued).
383. See supra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, there are a number of problems with relying on common-law
marriage in this context. First, compared to the legal landscape at the time
Loving was decided, today, only a small number of states permit commonlaw marriage and that number continues to dwindle.384 In 2019, for instance,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina prospectively abolished the doctrine
after finding that it violated the public policy of the state, which “is to
promote predictable, just outcomes for all parties involved in these disputes,
as well as to emphasize the sanctity of marital union.”385 Additionally, most
states abolished common-law marriage through legislation,386 and thus,
resurrecting the doctrine at this point could take considerable time and pose
significant political challenges.
Of greater salience, however, is the fact that the traditional tests for
common-law marriage are largely based on outdated, heteronormative views
of what a marriage should look like. For instance, many states require that
parties prove that they cohabitated and had a reputation in the community as
being married in order to establish an informal marriage.387 However,
relationships today—even formal marriages—are less likely to satisfy those
elements. Married couples are more likely today to live separately,388 and
with the reduced societal stigma concerning romantic relationships outside
of marriage, they are less likely to proclaim to those around them that they
are, in fact, married.389 This is especially true when considering same-sex
couples who may have feared discrimination and scorn had they openly
shared their relationship status with others. In that sense, cases dealing with
common-law marriage claims involving interracial couples are instructive.
For instance, in 1904, the Supreme Court of Missouri refused to recognize a
common-law marriage between a couple that had lived together for thirty
years, had eight children, and referred to one another as husband and wife.390
The problem was that the two failed the reputation requirement because “he
was never known to be with her and acknowledge her as his wife outside of

384. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
385. See Stone v. Thompson, 833 S.E.2d 266, 270 (S.C. 2019). The court would, however,
continue to recognize common-law marriages effectuated prior to that date. Id. at 267 (“[F]rom
this date forward—that is, purely prospectively—parties may no longer enter into a valid
marriage in South Carolina without a license.”).
386. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships:
The 2003 California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil
Rights and Family Law Perspective, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1555, 1577 (2004) (“[D]uring the past
two centuries, common law marriage has been legislatively abolished in most states.”).
387. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
388. See Simon Duncan, Why More Couples Are Choosing to Live Apart, THE
CONVERSATION (Jan. 3, 2020, 4:40 AM), https://theconversation.com/why-more-couples-arechoosing-to-live-apart-124532 [https://perma.cc/4TTN-LHW2] (“Not only is it surprisingly
common, but living apart together is increasingly seen as a new and better way for modern
couples to live.”).
389. See Stone, 833 S.E.2d at 269 (“By and large, society no longer conditions acceptance
upon marital status or legitimacy of children.”).
390. Keen v. Keen, 83 S.W. 526, 526–27 (Mo. 1904).
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his own house.”391 The reason he had not done so was clearly because he
was white and she was Black, but the court gave no weight to that fact.392
There is one final reason that common-law marriage does not work
particularly well in the context of same-sex relationships that predate
marriage equality, and it is a problem also shared by the marriage validation
principles of marriage by estoppel and putative marriage—namely, all three
operate on the assumption that there was in fact a marriage, albeit one that is
invalid or was entered into informally. Indeed, the essential requirement for
common-law marriage is a shared intent of the parties to be legally
married.393 Thus, common-law marriage requires not that the parties
subjectively believed their relationship to be the equivalent of a marriage but
that they intended to enter into a relationship that they believed would be
recognized as a legal marriage.394 In fact, states that allow common-law
marriage require the parties to have first had the capacity to marry, meaning
that they could have obtained a formal marriage had they so chosen.395
However, at the heart of the marriage equality movement lies the fact that
same-sex couples were denied that capacity. Thus, for those who entered
into same-sex relationships before gaining the right to legally wed, they may
have considered themselves the equivalent of married, but they were always
well aware that it was an extralegal relationship that came with no marital
benefits or protections.396
Likewise, marriage by estoppel assumes that, although there may have
been an invalid divorce, there was a subsequent marriage ceremony that was
otherwise valid.397 Thus, the doctrine has limited utility here—besides the
fact it only operates in a very specific factual setting, a subsequent marriage
was something same-sex couples simply could not obtain prior to marriage
equality. Similarly, the putative spouse doctrine requires a showing that there
was a marriage ceremony and that the parties entered into that “marriage” in
good faith.398 Again, prior to earning the right to marry, same-sex couples
could not meet that requirement. It is true that the law could retroactively
391. Id. at 527.
392. See id.; see also Vetrano v. Gardner, 290 F. Supp. 200, 206 (N.D. Miss. 1968)
(refusing to find a common-law marriage even though it was “suggested that the parties would
have conducted themselves publicly as husband and wife but for their fear of prosecution
under state criminal statutes banning interracial marriage”).
393. See Cerovic v. Stojkov, 134 A.3d 766, 777 (D.C. 2016).
394. See Morrow v. Dillard, 257 So. 3d 316, 324 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (“In order ‘[t]o
establish a common-law marriage, there must be a present agreement or mutual understanding
to enter into the marriage relationship.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Luther v. M&M
Chem. Co., 475 So. 2d 191, 193 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985))).
395. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
396. See, e.g., Swicegood v. Thompson, No. 2018-000008, 2020 WL 3551786, at *1 (S.C.
Ct. App. July 1, 2020) (“Thompson attested Swicegood knew they were not married. She
stated she and Swicegood participated in a ‘commitment ceremony’ . . . but they knew it was
not a wedding and that they could not legally marry.”); see also Kaiponanea T. Matsumura,
Choosing Marriage, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1999, 2032 (2017) (“The choice to marry also
embodies consent to the legal consequences of marriage.”).
397. See supra notes 258–74 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 275–90 and accompanying text.
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treat—as some states have done through legislation399—civil unions and
domestic partnerships as marriages, but that too fails because: (1) relatively
few states even offered those marriage alternatives400 and (2) like marriage
equality itself, those options did not become available until after many samesex couples had already spent years in committed relationships.401 Finally,
a putative spouse is not entitled to the full panoply of marital benefits, thus
making it less than an ideal template in this context.402
For that reason, the law of cohabitation may appear a better alternative, but
it too fails in this context. First, the doctrine and its attendant remedies are
directed solely at nonmarriage, and to achieve true marriage equality, there
needs to be some mechanism for treating an informal relationship as an actual
marriage. Second, most states that permit cohabitants to avail themselves of
marriage-like protections do so through contract law—often requiring
express, written agreements.403 The contract requirement is problematic here
because, even if one could succeed on that theory, the remedy is limited to
the terms of the contract and not the full range of marriage benefits. Further,
it is unlikely that same-sex couples who were in committed relationships
awaiting the right to legally marry would have even thought of their
relationships as contracts, much less have thought of them in express terms
that they then reduced to writing. There is, however, at least one state that
does not require an agreement but instead looks to the quality of the
relationship.404 Nonetheless, it still only provides successful litigants with
some of the benefits of marriage. It does not permit a finding that the couple
was in fact married, thus it denies them the full “constellation of benefits” to
which Obergefell spoke.405
What remains, then, are the equitable doctrines relating to parent-child
relationships. Although neither pertains to marriage, they nonetheless
provide helpful examples of how courts have constructed remedies that
extend family law protections to those who fail—at least formally—to
qualify as a “family.” As an initial matter, they both share the same defects
as some of the other doctrines, most notably the limited remedies they
provide. For instance, succeeding as an equitable parent merely offers the
399. See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text.
400. See, e.g., Mitchell L. Engler & Edward D. Stein, Not Too Separate or Unequal:
Marriage Penalty Relief After Obergefell, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1088 (2016) (“By 2012, . . .
nine states allowed same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships.”).
401. California was the first to pass a domestic partnership registry in 1999, and Vermont
was the first to pass legislation permitting civil unions in 2000. See David B. Oppenheimer et
al., Religiosity and Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 195, 197 (2014).
402. See, e.g., Allen v. W. Conf. of Teamsters Pension Tr. Fund, 788 F.2d 648, 650 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“Marriage is a status precisely defined in California and does not cover putative
spouses.”); Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1131 (Nev. 2004) (declining “to extend the
[putative spouse] doctrine to permit an award of spousal support”); Helen Chang, California
Putative Spouses: The Innocent, the Guilty, and the Law, 44 SW. L. REV. 327, 328 (2014)
(“Only certain benefits and privileges of a legal marriage are available to putative spouses.”).
403. See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 308–14 and accompanying text.
405. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015).
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possibility of some discrete parental rights—the equitable parent is still not
recognized as a legal parent.406 Likewise, establishing that one has been
equitably adopted only provides limited remedies vis-à-vis the rights
afforded to formally adopted children.407 Further, as detailed earlier, most
states are fairly formalistic when it comes to applying these doctrines. In
equitable adoption, for example, most courts insist on the existence of an
unfulfilled adoption contract, which may be unusual in situations where
informal adoption is likely to occur.408 Relatedly, equitable parentage cases
often focus too much on the role the legal parent played in cultivating the
relationship between the child and the quasi-parent and not enough on the
quality of the relationship that developed between the two or the harm that
would result from failing to protect that relationship.409
Nonetheless, a survey of the states that have applied these doctrines reveals
that a few have instead adopted a more nuanced approach, one that is similar
to how Washington deals with unmarried partners.410 Specifically, these
courts have utilized a functional approach, which “focuses the inquiry on
whether the relationship at issue shares the essential characteristics of a
traditionally accepted relationship and fulfills the same human needs.”411
Although such an approach might appear to be the minority approach
regarding these doctrines, family law as a whole has increasingly moved in
the functional direction.412 This Article contends that a similar approach
would also be well suited to this context and provide courts with the
necessary flexibility to examine same-sex relationships that predated
marriage equality.
Thus, what courts need is a new doctrine, equitable marriage, which would
draw on elements of the existing approaches to recognizing informal
relationships. At a minimum, this doctrine would need to give the courts
license to extend benefits to a marriage-like relationship that cannot
otherwise qualify as a legal marriage. In that sense, this new doctrine would

406. See, e.g., P.L. v. Shirley M., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 6, 8–9 (Ct. App. 2005) (“De facto parents
have limited rights . . . [and] that status does not give them the rights accorded to a parent or
legal guardian.”).
407. See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright, Inheritance Equity: Reforming the Inheritance Penalties
Facing Children in Nontraditional Families, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 46–47 (2015)
(“The doctrine provides limited remedies when a functional parent dies intestate, but virtually
no remedy for the plethora of ancillary rights dependent upon the legal status of being a parent
or a child.”).
408. See supra notes 320–21 and accompanying text.
409. Although some states are willing to consider harm, the harm has to be fairly severe
before the court will act on that basis. See, e.g., Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 445 (Conn.
2002) (holding that a quasi-parent can only justify state interference with the rights of the
child’s legal parent if the quasi-parent can prove that the child will otherwise “suffer real and
substantial emotional harm”).
410. See supra notes 308–14 and accompanying text.
411. Recent Development, Winning Arguments/Losing Themselves: The (Dys)functional
Approach in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559, 566 (1994).
412. See Kate Redburn, Note, Zoned Out: How Zoning Law Undermines Family Law’s
Functional Turn, 128 YALE L.J. 2412, 2422 (2019) (“In many states, parentage and partnership
doctrines have taken a ‘functional turn’ over the past forty years.”).
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be similar to the marriage validation principles of marriage by estoppel and
putative marriage, which protect void marriages, and equitable parentage and
adoption, which protect informal parent-child relationships. However,
unlike those doctrines, this new equitable doctrine needs to provide not just
some family law protections but all of the rights and obligations associated
with marriage. In that sense, as a remedy, it would be akin to common-law
marriage, which confers all the benefits associated with formal marriage. At
the same time, however, the approach that is needed in this context cannot
share common-law marriage’s rigid, outdated definition of marriage. Nor,
like typical cohabitation law and equitable adoption, can it blindly insist on
the existence of a contractual relationship. Instead, it should be more
functional, similar to that taken by a minority of courts regarding
cohabitation, equitable adoption, and equitable parentage. Finally, given the
fundamental right at issue, this doctrine requires nationwide application (in
whatever precise form each state decides) to remedy the constitutional harms
that stem from the states’ history of refusing to permit same-sex marriage.
B. Applying Equitable Marriage
At its most basic level, equitable marriage would allow an individual who
spent time in a same-sex relationship prior to the legalization of same-sex
marriage to argue that some portion of that relationship should be considered
either the equivalent of a legal marriage or, in the case of a couple that
ultimately did wed, as part of that eventual marriage. To prevail, a claimant
would have to demonstrate that the parties would have wed during that period
if the law had permitted them to do so. For those who succeed, the court
would then rule that there was a legal marriage during that period of the
relationship—a remedy that, like common-law marriage, brings with it all
the “same terms and conditions” as formal marriage.413
Given the large number of LGBTQIA+ Americans living today who were
in same-sex relationships impacted by the denial of marriage equality, it is
likely that individuals from this group will be asking courts for such relief
for years to come. As courts grapple with how to respond to such claims,
equitable marriage offers a way of not only addressing them but doing so in
a way that fulfills Obergefell’s promise of true marriage equality. Still, as
courts implement such a doctrine, a number of questions are likely to arise—
questions the remainder of this section identifies and attempts to address.
1. Who Has Standing?
As an initial matter, the question arises as to who would be permitted to
raise an equitable marriage claim and whether there would be any time limits
for doing so. There are two groups of people who could conceivably raise
such claims. First are those individuals who ultimately wed same-sex
partners with whom they had enjoyed nonmarital relationships prior to

413. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 676 (2015).
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obtaining the right to legally wed.414 The second group includes those who
were in nonmarital relationships that ended, either through divorce or
dissolution, prior to the arrival of formal marriage equality. Individuals in
either category would have the potential to raise a claim of equitable
marriage.
It would only be a potential claim given that some states may opt to impose
some time limits. There are two such restrictions that could come into play.
First, for those who ultimately did wed and are seeking to backdate their
wedding dates to an earlier point in time, there is the question of how soon
after obtaining the right to marry the couple wed. For instance, claimants
would certainly be more sympathetic if they requested and received a
marriage license the very day their state started issuing marriage licenses.
For those who did not immediately wed, however, the issue gets a bit more
complicated. Planning a wedding can certainly take time, but imagine a
couple that waited five years after their state started issuing licenses before
finally entering into a formal marriage. Given that marital backdating would
remain somewhat of an extraordinary remedy, the states may feel it only fair
to reserve that remedy to those who promptly did all they could to formalize
their relationships once given the ability to do so. Thus, it may well be that
states would be correct in refusing claims for equitable marriage by those
who waited too long to marry after receiving the right to do so.
States must be mindful, however, of not unfairly punishing those who did
not immediately wed. For a historical example, consider how the Southern
states, following passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, forced former slaves
to either promptly wed or face criminal conviction. Specifically, “[t]hose
who were already in cohabiting relationships were told to immediately
legalize their unions and legitimize their children and grandchildren.”415 At
least one Southern state gave the former slaves just six months to do so or
subject themselves “to criminal prosecution for adultery and fornication.”416
Thus, as Professor Katherine M. Franke has discussed, “the robust
enforcement of bigamy, fornication, and adultery laws served to domesticate
African American people who were either unaware of, or ignored, the formal
requirements of marital formation and dissolution.”417
In requiring that same-sex couples promptly marry to evidence an
intention to wed earlier than they had been legally permitted to do so, states
must be mindful that imposing too short a deadline would continue to
promote the very discrimination Obergefell was aimed at ending. There is,
unfortunately, one case where that has already occurred. In Ferry v. De

414. Because different states recognized this right to wed at different points in time, see
supra Part I, it is this Article’s assumption that equitable marriage would account for when
marriage equality became available in the state in which the same-sex couple resided.
415. HUNTER, supra note 3, at 236.
416. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399, 1421 (2004).
417. Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African
American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 251, 256–57 (1999).
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Longhi America, Inc.,418 a case arising out of California, Patrick Ferry and
Randy Sapp started living together in 1985.419 In 1993, they “were married
in a religious ceremony performed by a religious leader pursuant to the
principles of [their] beliefs.”420 The two men lived together until December
2013, when Randy tragically died as a result of a heater that allegedly
malfunctioned.421 When Patrick brought a wrongful death action, the
manufacturer moved to dismiss on the basis that Patrick was not Randy’s
legal spouse and, thus, lacked standing.422 The court agreed, noting that
same-sex marriage became legal in California in June 2013 and, thus, the two
men could have legally wed prior to Randy’s death if they had so intended.423
In essence, then, the two men had lived as a married couple for over thirty
years but were punished for not obtaining a marriage license in the six months
between finally gaining the right to do so and Randy’s death.
A second potential time restriction relates to when someone could bring a
claim for equitable marriage. For those who ultimately wed, it would seem
they would have to bring a claim at the point in time—most likely death or
divorce—when they are being denied a marriage benefit on the basis of
marital length. However, states might do what Utah has done regarding
common-law marriage and condition backdating on the requirement that the
spouses first petition the court, either during the relationship or within one
year of its termination, for an order setting the start date of their marriage at
a point earlier than when they formally wed.424 The benefit of such an
approach is that it forces individuals in this position to ask for backdating
sooner rather than later, when problems of proof may be exacerbated by the
passage of time or the death or incapacity of one of the spouses.
The question is more complex, though, when applied to those whose samesex relationships ended before they were permitted to marry. To illustrate,
consider two men who were in a long-term relationship that began in 1995
but ended in 2010 when the couple decided to go their separate ways. One
of the men dies in 2021. The other wants to claim that he should receive
widower’s benefits, and so he brings a claim for equitable marriage in which
he argues that the two would have wed prior to 2010 if permitted to do so.
There are a few ways states might deal with such issues. First, the court could
simply treat it as a marriage that was never legally terminated. That would
pose problems if either had subsequently remarried. However, under the
subsequent marriage presumption, most states would honor the later
marriage, presuming that the earlier one ended in divorce before the
418. 276 F. Supp. 3d 940 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
419. Id. at 942–43.
420. Id. at 943. According to Patrick, “‘[h]ad it been possible to do so,’ they ‘would have
obtained a marriage license.’” Id. (quoting Declaration of Plaintiff Patrick Ferry in Opposition
to Partial Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Ferry, 276 F. Supp. 3d 940 (No. 16-cv-00659)).
421. Id.
422. Id. at 944–45.
423. Id. at 947–50. Per the court, “the act of obtaining a marriage license is an
administrative burden that all couples must bear if they wish to avail themselves of the legal
rights and privileges of a formal marriage.” Id. at 952.
424. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (2020).
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subsequent marriage took place, and it would be very hard for the surviving
partner to prove otherwise.425 If neither had remarried, then the claimant
would be permitted to prove the existence of an equitable marriage.
A better solution, however, might be for states to create a statute of
limitations that applies to those who wish to have a pre-equality relationship
adjudicated a marriage. Texas, for instance, provides that a claimant’s ability
to establish a common-law marriage will fail “[i]f a proceeding in which a
marriage is to be proved . . . is not commenced before the second anniversary
of the date on which the parties separated and ceased living together.”426
States could implement something similar regarding equitable marriage for
those who seek marital benefits from a relationship that ended before the
arrival of formal marriage equality. However, the event that would start the
clock in this context would likely need to be the date on which the state began
recognizing equitable marriage, given that many of these relationships might
have already ended many years earlier.
2. How Would a Claimant Prove an Equitable Marriage?
One might ask, given the deprivations they have faced regarding marriage,
why not simply give same-sex couples the benefit of the doubt and
automatically presume that any relationship that existed prior to marriage
equality was a marriage and is entitled to all the corresponding rights and
benefits? There are two responses to that question. First, such a permissive
approach could very easily give rise to fraudulent claims, especially
considering that such claims might not arise until after the alleged spouse has
died. Second, marriage does not simply bring benefits, it also brings
obligations. Accordingly, whenever an individual succeeds in backdating a
same-sex marriage, that person’s spouse then has marital obligations—
obligations that person may have never intended to bear. In other words,
backdating a same-sex marriage might be very beneficial to one spouse, but
it can also be quite damaging to the other.427 Thus, more careful
consideration is required if the law is to adequately protect both members of
the same-sex couple.
Indeed, not every same-sex relationship that came into being prior to
formal marriage equality would have been a marriage. To begin with, the
decision to marry typically does not arise until after some period of
courtship,428 which usually takes as much time as the couple deems

425. See Higdon, supra note 195, at 117 (“In essence, the subsequent marriage presumption
operates by presuming a divorce, when in fact, one likely never occurred.”).
426. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(b) (2019).
427. Relatedly, if one partner dies, retroactively finding a marriage can cause significant
harm to the deceased partner’s heirs if that person died intestate. See, e.g., Irene D. Johnson,
There’s a Will, but No Way—Whatever Happened to the Doctrine of Testamentary Freedom
and What Can (Should) We Do to Restore It?, 4 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 105, 123
(2011) (“Intestate succession statutes send a decedent’s property to a spouse and children, or
if there is no spouse or children, then to blood relatives.”).
428. One scholar has described marriage as having four distinct stages:
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necessary. Thus, just because a claimant can prove the existence of a preequality relationship, does not mean the parties would have been married at
that previous point in time. Further, with the reduced social stigma
associated with cohabitation,429 a growing number of different-sex couples
consciously choose not to marry, and those same considerations might have
easily influenced same-sex couples to elect to do the same even if they had
had the option of marrying. Additionally, some same-sex couples may have
possessed unique reasons for rejecting the idea of marriage, most notable of
which is the belief of some in the LGBTQIA+ community that “it puts undue
emphasis on a heteronormative institution.”430 As one commentator recently
described, “[g]ay marriage is not without controversy, even among LGBT
rights activists. Queer theorists, radical feminists, and libertarians like Judith
Butler, Martha Fineman, and David Boaz, reject gay marriage and advocate
for the abolition of marriage in general.”431
Thus, for all those reasons, the question arises as to how courts are to, ex
post, differentiate between same-sex relationships that would have been
marriages and those that would not have. Even for those that would have
been marriages at some point prior to formal marriage equality, the question
becomes, when did the relationship reach that point? All of these questions
are made even more complicated by the fact that, once the same-sex
relationship ends, the two parties may have very different perspectives on
what was intended at any one point in time. And, as Professor Kaiponanea
Matsumura has pointed out, “[a]n individual’s right to autonomous selfdefinition does not extend to conscription of an unwilling partner.”432 Thus,
failure to get it right could be quite damaging to one or both individuals in
the same-sex relationship.
Consider, for instance, Estate of Leyton v. Hunter,433 where a New York
court declined to backdate a same-sex marriage when doing so would have
harmed the surviving member of that relationship.434 There, Mauricio
Leyton’s mother and sister brought suit to have his former partner, David

[T]he courtship stage, in which the couple meets and decides to marry; the entry
stage, in which the couple undergoes whatever licensing and ceremonial
requirements are necessary to achieve marital status; the intact marriage stage, in
which the couple is legally married; and the exit stage, in which the couple divorces,
has the marriage annulled, or one of the spouses dies.
Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625,
1628 (2007).
429. See Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97 B.U.
L. REV. 425, 444 (2017) (noting that, “[t]oday, there is less social stigma associated with living
in a nonmarital family”).
430. David Luban, The Moral Complexity of Cause Lawyers Within the State, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 705, 709 (2012).
431. Jessica Brown, Human Rights, Gay Rights, or Both?: International Human Rights
Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 28 FLA. J. INT’L L. 217, 221 (2016).
432. See Matsumura, supra note 396, at 2045.
433. 22 N.Y.S.3d 422 (App. Div. 2016).
434. Id. at 423.
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Hunter, disqualified as a beneficiary under Mauricio’s will.435 When
Mauricio died, his will identified David as his “former romantic partner and
long-time friend.”436 Mauricio’s family argued that, under New York law,
David was a “former spouse,” and thus he should be disqualified as a
beneficiary.437 The two men were never formally married. They did,
however, have a commitment ceremony in 2002 but eventually separated.438
As a result, Mauricio’s family argued that “because the minister at the
commitment ceremony observed that [Mauricio and David] were entering
into a state of companionship that the world recognizes as marriage, they
were in fact married, and therefore their subsequent separation was a
divorce.”439 The lower court denied the family members’ claim on the basis
that same-sex marriage was not permitted in New York until 2011.440 The
appellate court affirmed and further noted that Obergefell “does not compel
a retroactive declaration” that a marriage existed in this instance, holding that
“according the union between decedent and Hunter retroactive legal effect
would be inconsistent with their understanding that they had never been
legally married.”441
The challenge, then, is “to design clear criteria that separate marriage-like
unions from those in which the parties are not married because they do not
want marital commitment or obligations.”442 And when it comes to setting
that criteria, at least one scholar has advocated for “bright-line markers.”443
Specifically, Professor Allison Tait has proposed that courts look to
“instances of clear legal intention to form an economic partnership.”444 Tait
includes within that category asset-specific events, such as the purchase of a
family home; the date upon which the couple entered into an alternative
marital state, like a civil union or a domestic partnership; and other legal
contracts that signal “shared purpose and relationship commitment.”445 It is
the position of this Article that these “legal markers” would indeed be
excellent indicators for courts to rely on when deciding whether a same-sex
relationship that predated marriage equality would have been marital or was
instead intentionally nonmarital.

435. In re Leyton, No. 2013-4842, 2015 WL 3882524, at *1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. June 16, 2015)
(“The relief sought would increase petitioners’ interests as beneficiaries under the will.”),
aff’d, Estate of Leyton, 22 N.Y.S.3d 422.
436. Id.
437. Id. (relying on N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(a)(4) (McKinney 2020)).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. (“Here, petitioners seek to have this court apply the Marriage Equality Act
retroactively to the commitment ceremony, deeming that ceremony as formalizing a marriage
and the subsequent separation as a divorce.”).
441. Estate of Leyton v. Hunter, 22 N.Y.S.3d 422, 423 (App. Div. 2016).
442. Scott, supra note 300, at 258.
443. See Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1303 (2015).
444. Id.
445. Id. at 1303–06. According to Tait, “[c]ivil unions, registered domestic partnerships,
designated beneficiary relationships, and relationship contracts all enable couples to signal a
clear legal intent.” Id. at 1306.
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Courts, however, must be willing to delve deeper. As discussed earlier in
the context of cohabitation and equitable adoption,446 relying too heavily on
legal formalities will precipitate discrimination against a number of samesex couples. For instance, only a small number of states even permitted
same-sex couples to enter into civil unions and domestic partnerships.447
Thus, those who lived in states without that option would be at a disadvantage
if courts were to place undue weight on those marriage alternatives. Further,
even those states that did offer that option did so only relatively recently,448
meaning that many individuals in those states had already spent years in a
same-sex relationship before they even had the choice of entering into a civil
union or domestic partnership.
Somewhat relatedly, if courts were to rely too heavily on contractual
arrangements between same-sex partners—such as designated beneficiary or
cohabitation agreements449—as a proxy for their earlier desire to marry, that
would penalize those individuals who were ignorant of such options or who
lacked access to the legal representation required to effectuate such
agreements.450 Relying too heavily on the acquisition of joint property, like
a family home, would likewise have a disproportionate impact on those who
were in less affluent relationships—ones that could not afford such
purchases. In short, relying exclusively on “bright-line” markers would fail
to account for various ways in which same-sex couples might have expressed
their commitment to one another when formal marriage was not an option.
As a result, it is the position of this Article that courts should look beyond
discrete markers and instead adopt a more functional approach. Unlike the
more rigid approaches courts have taken regarding cohabitation and
equitable adoption, courts should permit claimants to rely on other evidence
that the couple would have married had that option been available. For
instance, as evidenced by the equitable parentage cases discussed above,451
a couple’s decision to have and jointly raise children should likewise have
bearing on the question of equitable marriage. States that permit commonlaw marriage already take into account such evidence when deciding whether
there was an informal marriage452 and it would thus seem odd to apply a more

446. See supra Parts III.C–D.
447. See Engler & Stein, supra note 400, at 1088.
448. See Oppenheimer et al., supra note 401, at 197.
449. See Tait, supra note 443, at 1306.
450. Tait acknowledges these limitations. See id. at 1309 (“Using legal markers privileges
those individuals who have access to legal representation and can write cohabitation
agreements, wills, and other legal documents.”).
451. See supra Part III.E.
452. See, e.g., Seabrook v. Simmons, No. 2005-UP-459, 2005 WL 7084298, at *3 (S.C. Ct.
App. July 19, 2005) (noting that the preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion
that the parties had effectuated a common-law marriage, including the fact that they had two
children together); see also Dubler, supra note 226, at 971 (“[I]n cases involving children,
who would be deemed illegitimate if a court found their parents’ relationship nonmarital,
courts recognizing common law marriages clung to a similar presumption in favor of
legitimacy as opposed to illegitimacy.”).
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restrictive test here in light of the remedial nature of a doctrine like equitable
marriage, especially when such a remedy is likely constitutionally required.
Similarly, the cohabitation and reputation requirements of common-law
marriage should likewise play some role in equitable marriage. Individuals
who were in same-sex relationships that involved many years of living
together should be able to at least present such evidence for the court to
consider. After all, “in the case of long-term relationships—especially those
accompanied by economic dependency and specification of roles—extracontractual considerations like protecting weaker, dependent parties, take on
a greater weight.”453 Indeed, as one scholar points out, “long-term
cohabitation and joint ownership of property might be the best indicator that
two people expect to be able to liveout [sic] their lives enjoying the jointlyowned property.”454 So too should those who publicly represented
themselves as being in a committed relationship—either through general
reputation in the community or through informal declarations like a
commitment ceremony—be permitted to rely on that evidence to prove that
they would have married had that choice been available.
This is not to say that any of this evidence, by itself, should be dispositive
of an earlier intent to wed. After all, the evidence could objectively indicate
more than one possible intent and the parties themselves may not be
particularly helpful in sorting that out given that “at the dissolution of a
relationship, parties may easily disagree or remember differently what intent
existed at what point in time.”455 Nonetheless, to foreclose claimants even
raising such evidence, and instead allow only specific events to serve as
evidence of marital intent, would fail to recognize the nuance that is
necessary to achieve true marriage equality in any meaningful way.456 As
Professor Jeffrey Evan Stake observed: “What different people want and
expect out of marriage, and divorce, is not the same, probably ought not be
the same, and in any case cannot be made the same.”457
That last point has particular salience in this context. Namely, homosexual
relationships are not identical to heterosexual relationships. Many of those
who spent time in same-sex relationships prior to marriage equality grew up
453. Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will?: Toward a Pluralist Regulation of
Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1621 (2009).
454. Patricia A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481,
516 (2009); see also Kandoian, supra note 233, at 1864 (describing “long-term cohabitation”
as “evidence presumptive of marriage”).
455. Tait, supra note 443, at 1308 n.323.
456. Professor Kaiponanea Matsumura suggests one way to prove the existence of an
informal marriage while remaining sensitive to the concern of “conscripting unwilling or
unwitting participants into marriage” is to have different standards of review depending on the
factual setting of the case. See Matsumura, supra note 396, at 2038. Specifically, when the
parties disagree as to the existence of a marriage, he advocates for a clear and convincing
standard “[i]n light of the importance of self-definition, notice, and consent.” Id. at 2055.
However, when the marriage is agreed on by the parties but is being contested by the
government or other third party, “the more lenient preponderance standard” may be more
appropriate. Id.
457. Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397, 398–
99 (1992).
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in a society where marriage was not only impossible but the relationships
they were permitted to have were both marginalized and, in many respects,
demonized. In light of those societal forces, it is entirely reasonable to
assume that those same-sex relationships would look somewhat different
from traditional marriages that were occurring around the same time. Thus,
as courts go about trying to discern whether a prior same-sex relationship
would have been a marriage, they must be careful to not be overly swayed
by heterosexist conceptions of what marriage should look like.458 In that
sense, the words of scholar Paula Ettlebrick, which she uttered in 1989 when
marriage equality was only a whisper, are particularly instructive: “The
moment we argue . . . that we should be treated as equals because we are
really just like married couples and hold the same values to be true, we
undermine the very purpose of our movement and begin the dangerous
process of silencing our different voices.”459
Many of these differences were explored above when discussing how
common-law marriage provides a less than ideal remedy in this context.460
Specifically, same-sex couples who faced discrimination and hostility over
their relationship status may have been less likely to live together or
announce their relationship status to the larger community. But there is
another key difference as well and it relates to the gender stereotypes often
associated with marriage. As courts attempt to look back in time to determine
whether a same-sex relationship would have been a marriage, they will be
unable to rely on the popular stereotypes of the “working husband” and
“homemaker wife.” There is a great deal of literature about how so much of
family law has been built on those stereotypes,461 but one of the most recent
examples, which is particularly instructive in this context, is the law of
nonmarriage and cohabitation. As Professor Albertina Antognini has pointed
out, in looking at cases that wrestle with whether to extend marital benefits
to cohabitating couples based on how closely those relationships resemble a
marriage, “[t]he overarching definition of marriage that these decisions
impose is one steeped in archetypal gender relations.”462 When analyzing
relationships involving two men or two women, however, such defaults are
even less likely to be effective and, thus, the law must “confront[] the
sleeping dog, by challenging the rigidity of gender role and identity that

458. See Matsumura, supra note 396, at 2051 (“[C]ourts ask whether the parties’ conduct
matches performances that the law deems salient. These performances tend to reinscribe a
narrow view of acceptable performances that often reflect harmful stereotypes.”).
459. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in WE ARE
EVERYWHERE: A HISTORICAL SOURCEBOOK IN GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS 757, 758 (Mark
Blasius & Shane Phelan eds., 1997).
460. See supra notes 384–96 and accompanying text.
461. Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1, 60 (2017).
462. See id.; see, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the
Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 291 (2006)
(noting that “pernicious gender stereotypes . . . arise[] from the patriarchal (and racist) context
in which we have traditionally approached marriage, reproduction, and family law more
generally”).
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conspires with political will to deny the creative possibility and richness in
all lives of committed intimate relation.”463
Thus, just as Obergefell distilled marriage down to the four essential
attributes that rendered it a fundamental right,464 so too must courts discern
what are the hallmarks of marital relationships—after heterosexist notions
are stripped away—that would allow an individual in a same-sex relationship
to prove an intent to be married during a time when that right was being
unconstitutionally denied. Although the above discussion attempts to
delineate what form this evidence might take, courts must be mindful of the
lens through which they view that evidence. In short, it is no longer
permissible to use the pre-Obergefell construction of marriage.
CONCLUSION
In Obergefell, when discussing the flexible role that history and tradition
play in constitutional jurisprudence, the majority noted it “respects our
history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the
present.”465 Similarly, the courts cannot allow unconstitutional deprivations
from the past to continue harming people in the present. Thus, as courts
wrestle with how to fulfill Obergefell’s promise of true marriage equality,
they must be mindful of all the individuals who continue to face harm as a
result of the states’ denial of same-sex marriage through laws that, until 2015,
were considered perfectly legal in many states. Although some courts have
begun experimenting with ways to backdate marriages and thus ameliorate
those harms, states have done so on an inconsistent basis and none have
fashioned remedies that adequately capture the unique and varied attributes
of same-sex relationships in the United States. Thus, it is the position of this
Article that states must do more. Specifically, by borrowing and expanding
on the equitable doctrines that already exist for awarding family law benefits
to those in informal family-like relationships, the states must develop a
doctrine for recognizing equitable marriage to protect the rights and interests
of those individuals who spent time in relationships that would have been
marriages had an unconstitutional law not stood firmly in the way. In that
respect, the words of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in United States v.
Virginia466 are instructive: “A remedial decree . . . must closely fit the
constitutional violation; it must be shaped to place persons unconstitutionally
denied an opportunity or advantage in ‘the position they would have occupied
in the absence of [discrimination].’”467

463. John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1119, 1149 (1999) (emphasis added).
464. See supra notes 107–14 and accompanying text.
465. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015).
466. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
467. Id. at 547 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974)).

